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 Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of a plant or animal disease with the 
goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.  After the 2002 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center, the security of the food supply is of increasing 
concern to the United States.  A major incidence of agroterrorism or food tampering 
would have far reaching impacts on the economy and public health.  The first objective of 
this project was to determine knowledge and concern of agroterrorism in meat processing 
facilities in Kentucky, and to determine knowledge and concern of food tampering and 
food defense in food service establishments in Warren County, Kentucky.  The second 
objective was to determine security strategies that were being implemented by these 
facilities.  Two separate surveys, one for meat processors and the other for food service 
establishments, were designed to meet these objectives. 
An observational study was conducted for meat processing facilities.  It was 
found that these facilities were generally unconcerned with agroterrorism, although a 
reasonable amount of security implementations were in place at these facilities.  A 
statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurant food service 
establishments, such as schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed.  Both types of food 
service establishments expressed little concern about a food tampering event.  Non-
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restaurant food service establishments were slightly more concerned than restaurants 
about both food tampering and food defense.
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Introduction & Background 
Introduction 
This project had two primary goals.  The first was to determine how meat 
processors in Kentucky feel about the likelihood of an agroterrorism event and what 
prevention and security strategies were being implemented in these facilities.  The second 
was to determine the knowledge and concern of managers in food service establishments 
about food tampering and food defense and what security strategies were being employed 
in their establishments.  Agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of a plant 
or animal disease with the goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.1  
Agroterrorism is considered a subset of bioterrorism, so this review begins with an 
introduction to this concept and follows with a description of agroterrorism and factors 
that make agroterrorism unique from other types of terrorism events.  It concludes with a 
review of food tampering in food service establishments. 
 
Bioterrorism 
According to the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a 
biological attack, or biocrime, is considered “the intentional release of a pathogen or 
biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”2  Biocrimes can be further subdivided into 
bioterrorism related events and non-bioterrorism related events.3  For the purposes of this 
review, Carus’ definition of bioterrorism will be used.  Bioterrorism is defined as the 
threat or intentional use of a biological agent against a person or group for ideological 
reasons, which include those crimes that are politically, ecologically, or religiously 
inspired.4  A non-bioterrorism biocrime is defined as the threat or intentional use of a 
biological agent against a person or group for personal profit, such as those crimes that 
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are committed for personal revenge or for monetary gain.3  Bioterrorism, in general, is 
considered a low-incidence, high-impact event.4  Essentially this means that, although the 
total number of bioterrorism events is modest, the potential health and economic impacts 
of a single event could be devastating.  For this reason, it is critical that resources be 
devoted to the prevention of such an attack. 
Fortunately, there have been few documented instances of bioterrorism in the U.S.  
Information concerning terrorist attacks that have occurred worldwide from 1970 to 
today can be accessed on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  Currently, the GTD 
contains more than 98,000 instances of terrorism.5  Of these, only 25 documented the use 
of biological material as a weapon.  Nineteen of these 25 instances of bioterrorism 
occurred in the U.S.5  Each case is described in further detail below. 
• The first cases occurred in 1984 in The Dalles, Oregon.  A religious 
extremist group known as the Rajneeshees poisoned local restaurant salad 
bars with Salmonella typhimurium (S. Typhi), which is a bacteria that 
causes salmonella food poisoning.4  Four of the 19 cases of bioterrorism in 
the U.S. are attributed to this group.  Three cases of S. Typhi poisoning by 
the Rajneeshees resulted in injury.5  A total of 778 people5 were injured in 
these attacks, including 45 hospitalizations.4  No deaths were reported.  
The Rajneeshees were attempting to temporarily incapacitate people in 
order to prevent them from voting in an upcoming election.4   
• The second occurred in 2001.  Letters containing spores of the bacteria 
Bacillus anthracis, otherwise known as anthrax, were mailed to several 
news media outlets in New York and Florida and two U.S. Senators.6  The 
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first letters were postmarked one week after the September 11 attack on 
the World Trade Center in New York City.6  The first case of inhalational 
anthrax was identified on October 4, 2011.7  The remaining letters were 
postmarked on October 9, 2001.  In total, 22 people were infected with 
anthrax, including five deaths.6  The scope of this case is relatively small.  
However, it is estimated that the total economic cost of the outbreak, 
including clean-up costs for contaminated buildings, was more than $1 
billion.8  It is estimated that a mass bioterrorist attack could cost anywhere 
from $200 billion into the trillions.9 
• In 2003, a letter containing ricin was mailed to both the United States 
Department of Transportation10 (DoT) and the White House.11  Both 
letters were discovered in postal facilities prior to their final delivery 
destination.  Both letters had the words “caution RICIN POISON 
Enclosed in sealed container Do not open without proper protection” on 
the outside of the envelope.12  Enclosed in each envelope was a metal vial 
containing ricin and a letter.  The writer of the letter claimed to be an 
owner of a trucking company that was unhappy with new federal 
regulations regarding truck driver hours of service.  He/she claimed to be 
able to produce large amounts of ricin, which the writer was planning to 
use if the new laws were not repealed.  The writer signed each letter with 
the moniker “Fallen Angel.”12 
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• On February 2, 2004, the office of senate majority leader Bill Frist was 
delivered an envelope containing ricin.  The sender was never discovered.  
No injuries were reported.13 
• In 2005, anthrax was discovered in a mail facility in Arlington, Virginia.  
One hundred people received antibiotic treatment as a result of this 
incident, but no casualties were reported.  No responsibility was ever 
claimed for this incident.14 
• The final incident occurred in 2010.  Members of an animal rights group, 
known as the Justice Department, sent razor blades they claimed were 
contaminated with AIDS-infected blood to two employees of the 
University of Los Angeles in California.15  The group was threatening 
these employees for their work on animal research involving primate 
vivisection.  Although the razor blades contained blood, the presence of 
AIDS was never confirmed.16 
Since much damage can be caused by one bioterrorism event, it seems fortunate 
that few attacks have occurred on U.S. soil.  It seems especially fortunate given that 
evidence has been documented proving that terrorist groups present in the U.S. have been 
discussing the use of biological weapons since the 1960s.4  Several examples are listed 
below.  This list is by no means exhaustive, and many other incidents are documented by 
Carus in his working paper entitled Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.4   
• In 1972, a white supremacist organization in Chicago known as R.I.S.E. 
was found with possession of S. Typhi, the organism that causes typhoid 
fever.4  The group was planning to contaminate the city’s water supply in 
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an attempt to kill people.  The members of the group described themselves 
as “inoculated,” so that they would survive the outbreak.  The surviving 
members of the group would then be the base for a new “master race.”17 
• In 1974, a safehouse operated by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) 
was discovered to contain, among other items, a book entitled “Germ 
Warfare.”  There was no evidence found to suggest that the SLA ever 
developed the ability or means to commit acts of biological terrorism.18   
• In 1992, four members of a group known as the “Patriot’s Council” were 
found in violation of The Biological Weapons and Antiterrorism Act of 
1989.19  These members were involved in a plot to bomb a federal 
building4 and murder a sheriff’s deputy and a U.S. Marshall with the 
toxin, ricin.19  One member was found in possession of the ricin they were 
planning on using.4 
• In 1998, three men, all members of a Texas separatist organization, were 
arrested for threatening to use biological weapons against key members of 
the U.S. government and their families.20  Threats were sent to former 
U.S. president Bill Clinton, former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, and 
the director of the U.S. Secret Service, among others.  The men were 
found with devices they were developing for the purpose of injecting 
biological material into victims.  No materials for use in biological 
weapons were discovered, however, it was found that the men were 
planning to manufacture botulinum toxin with a mixture containing rotten 
chicken meat, dirt, and green beans.20 
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• In 1999, an Egyptian extremist military group known as the World Islamic 
Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders was reported to have biological 
weapons.  The report noted that the group planned to use the weapons 
against targets in the U.S. and Israel.  The possession of biological 
weapons by this group was never confirmed.4 
While bioterrorism events remain few in number, agroterrorism events are fewer 
still.  There are only a handful of documented agroterrorism events that have occurred 
around the world.  This is fortunate; however, it may have the unfortunate consequence 
of luring the population into a false sense of security.  The discussion will continue with a 
description of agroterrorism and some unique factors that make it both simple to 
accomplish and potentially devastating.  The next section reviews the published literature 
on agroterrorism. 
 
Agroterrorism 
Agroterrorism is a relatively recent term and only came to be studied in earnest in 
the late 1990s.21  It was a term developed to describe the deliberate introduction of a plant 
or animal disease in order to cause fear, economic devastation, illness, or death.1  To 
summarize this concept further, agroterrorism is terrorism against agriculture.  
Agriculture includes animal and plant husbandry, as well as the cultivation of any other 
product intended for human consumption.22  The World Fact Book, published by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), estimates that agriculture consisted of 1.2% of the 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 and 0.7% of the U.S. labor force in 2009.23  
In 2011, meat production contributed $84.9 billion to the U.S. economy.24  These 
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numbers seem to imply that agriculture does not represent a significant portion of the 
economy.  However, the food and fiber system, which includes agriculture and any 
activity which utilizes agriculture products, supplied 11% of the GDP and 16% of the 
labor force in 2002.1  Due to the heavy influence it has on public health and the economy, 
agriculture falls under the definition of critical infrastructure. 
In the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016(e), critical infrastructure was 
defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of these matters.”25  This definition is very apropos in a discussion of the 
potential impacts an agroterrorism event would have on the United States.  The 2009 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) lays the foundation for the federal 
government’s role in infrastructure protection.  In section 2.2.2 of the NIPP, the bulk of 
the responsibility for agriculture protection is assigned to the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).26  These agencies 
and others have a number of policies in place to protect agriculture, although food 
defense plans continue to be voluntary.27   
In general, agroterrorism is not considered to be the primary choice for a typical 
terrorist.1  Agroterrorism does not usually involve immediate human casualties, and it 
does not have the shock factor that many other methods of terrorism employ.  In addition, 
it is often difficult to identify the source of an outbreak, whether it is started deliberately 
or accidentally.  Thus, an agroterrorism event may be incorrectly labeled as accidental, 
and the perpetrator will never receive credit unless he/she comes forward.1  Although this 
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may explain why there are few incidences of agroterrorism, it is not a topic that should be 
ignored.  In 2002, right after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York City, hundreds of pages of documents were discovered in Al Qaeda 
hideouts indicating that this group was interested in committing acts of agroterrorism 
against the U.S. and had documented plans to accomplish this task.28  In addition, there 
are aspects of an agroterrorism event that make it extremely difficult to prevent and 
contain.  As the focus of this portion of the project is meat production, this discussion 
will be focused on the difficulties of securing livestock and meat processing facilities. 
Firstly, the majority of livestock on farms are stored on large open pastures that 
are difficult to secure against intruders.1  Nearly one-quarter of U.S. land is devoted to 
grazing land for livestock.29  This amounts to approximately 525 million acres of land29 
that is widely spread across the U.S.  Securing such a large land area is a daunting task.  
Furthermore, the livestock on these farms are often sent away for slaughtering, packing, 
and processing, widening the spread of infection.  In general, a pound of meat travels an 
average of 1,000 miles before it is consumed.21  Once present in slaughtering facilities, 
the livestock are contained in confined, and often overcrowded, areas.  Confining animals 
in enclosed spaces increases the likelihood of spreading disease.1   
Secondly, there has been a widespread eradication effort by the U.S. against 
animal diseases.  Several complications have arisen as a result of this.  First, the same 
effort at eradication has not been made in many other countries.  This means that many 
animal diseases, although not prevalent in the U.S., are endemic to other countries.1  This 
gives potential terrorists easy access to certain diseases.  Second, veterinarians, who are 
generally considered the most trusted source of advice on sick animals,27 often have 
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never seen cases of certain animal diseases and may have a difficult time recognizing the 
signs and symptoms.30  This may result in a large amount of time passing before 
realization that an attack has occurred.  Third, livestock have been subjected to overuse of 
antibiotics, resulting in increased bacterial resistance to multiple drugs.30  This may make 
it more difficult to treat livestock that have become contaminated with a bacteria. 
 
Documented Incidences of Agroterrorism 
There are very few documented incidences of agroterrorism.  This section will 
examine cases occurring after the year 1900. 
• The first documented cases of agroterrorism in the 20th century  occurred 
during World War I, when Germany targeted horses and other livestock of 
various Allied countries.21   The first instance of this took place in 1915.  
The specific targets were horses and mules that the U.S. was planning to 
take overseas to its military in Europe.  German agents attempted to infect 
these animals with Burkholderia mallei bacteria, known for causing the 
disease Glanders.5  This disease is highly contagious among horses, 
donkeys, and mules but is only seen sporadically in other species of 
animals.31  Very few human cases have been reported among people 
working closely with infected animals, however, no human-to-human 
cases have been documented in the U.S.32  It is unclear if the initial 
attempt was successful.21  Similar attempts by Germany were conducted 
between 1915 – 1918, targeting the U.S., Romania4, Spain, Norway, 
Argentina, and France.21 
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• In 1952, an agroterrorism incidence occurred as part of the Mau Mau 
uprising in Kenya.21  The conflict centered around an anti-colonial 
military group, known as the Mau Mau.  This group was responsible for 
the poisoning of 33 head of cattle belonging to citizens of a British colony 
in Kenya.  The Mau Mau used a toxin found in African milk bush, 
resulting in the death of eight of the poisoned cattle.  The British believe 
that this was one of many attacks targeting livestock by this group, 
although documented evidence of this is poor.4 
• In 1979, a massive outbreak of anthrax occurred in Zimbabwe.  It is 
postulated that a Rhodesian military group deliberately infected cattle with 
the bacteria, however evidence for this theory is circumstantial at best.33  
The deliberate nature of this attack has never been confirmed.  Carus 
states that although responsibility for this attack has been publicly 
associated with nationalist guerillas, this may be nothing more than 
Rhodesian propaganda.4  As a result of this outbreak, more than 10,000 
people became ill, including 182 deaths.33 
• In 1985, Carus reported a possible instance of agroterrorism among 
Mexican workers employed to remove screwworms from livestock.  The 
workers may have deliberately infected the livestock with screwworms in 
order to keep their jobs.  However, the only evidence for this appears to be 
a statement from a USDA official, and the attack was never confirmed.4 
• In 1997, New Zealand farmers introduced rabbit hemorrhagic disease 
(RHD) in an effort to control the feral rabbit population.33  The perpetrator 
11 
 
of the initial attack was never found, although some farmers did admit 
contributing to the further spread of the disease.  RHD is not transmissible 
to humans.4 
 
Potential Economic Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event 
While the global incidence of agroterrorism remains low, there is enough 
evidence from other, non-deliberate agricultural crises to indicate that the economic 
burden from a single act of agroterrorism would be extremely costly.  In Belgium during 
the year 1999, animal feed became contaminated with the chemical compound, dioxin.  
Meat production in the Netherlands was significantly impacted with an estimated cost of 
more than $493 million.34  In Canada, a minor outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease 
occurred between 1951 and 1953.  As a result, approximately 2,000 head of cattle were 
destroyed.  The direct cost of this for Canada was $2 million.  However, the outbreak 
caused the value of Canadian livestock to decrease, resulting in the loss of $650 million 
in beef exports.35  Using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, a $650 million loss in 1951 would be approximately a $5.8 billion loss 
in 2012.36  In a study published in The Journal of the American Veterinary Medical 
Association in 2002, the estimated cost of a major outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 
the U.S. may be upwards of $14 billion.37 
 
Potential Public Health Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event 
The public health burden in an agroterrorism attack can be viewed in multiple 
ways.  First is the impact on food production.  In 2011, the U.S. produced over 49 billion 
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pounds of beef, hog, and sheep meat products.  Approximately eight billion pounds of 
these meat products were exported to other countries.  Approximately 4.5 billion pounds 
of meat products were imported from other countries.38  In total, the U.S. produced and 
imported 45.5 billion pounds of beef, hog, and sheep meat products meant for 
consumption.  Given the current United States population of approximately 300 million39, 
if all this meat was consumed and none wasted (a fairly unlikely outcome), this would 
amount to approximately 152 pounds of meat per person per year.  The 2010 Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans published by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Unites States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
publishes a range of recommended calorie intake of 1600 – 2400 calories for women and 
2000 – 3000 for men, dependent upon the level of physical activity.40  For the purpose of 
this analysis, it will be assumed that the average American needs 2,000 calories per day 
to maintain a healthy weight.  In one year, a healthy American should consume 
approximately 730,000 calories.  Although different types of food contain differing 
amounts of calories per pound, it is generally assumed that there are 3,500 calories per 
pound.41  Therefore, in one year, a healthy American should consume approximately 208 
pounds of food.  If a healthy American consumes 152 pounds of meat per year, nearly 
75% of his/her diet would be meat products.  This is a bit extreme, however, even if it is 
assumed that 10% of a healthy American’s diet is meat products, a major agroterrorism 
event could potentially result in a deficit of 20 pounds of food per person per year. 
The second impact on public health that may result from an agroterrorism event is 
the transfer of disease between animals to humans.  This type of disease is known as a 
zoonotic disease.  The problem of containing zoonotic disease is an ongoing one.  Nearly 
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75% of new emerging diseases are considered zoonotic.  Approximately 62% of known 
diseases in humans have come from an animal source.42  One of the more familiar cases 
of a zoonotic disease pandemic is the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak 
in the early 2000s.  This disease affected more than 8,000 patients, including 916 
deaths.43  The World Health Organization (WHO) published a fatality rate of 0% to 50% 
that was highly dependent on the age of the patient.44  Public health agencies all over the 
world were on high alert, and it caused widespread global panic.  The Hong Kong 
Department of Public Health issued a quarantine of a small street block containing 264 
apartments.  More than half of the residents of these apartments were not home at the 
time of the quarantine, implying the spread of the disease was continuing.  Police 
presence was required to keep the remaining residents from violating the quarantine 
order.45  This scenario illustrates the difficulty for public health departments everywhere 
to contain an epidemic.  As the number of cases increase, quarantining the infection 
becomes more and more impossible and the economic cost continues to escalate.45  In a 
study on the role of law enforcement in an agroterrorism event, it stated that police 
presence may be required to enforce quarantine for up to 60 days following the outbreak 
of a foreign animal disease.46 
 
Food Tampering 
The subject of the second portion of this project was food service establishments.  
To discuss food defense for these establishments, the focus must shift from a large scale 
form of attack, such as agroterrorism, to a smaller scale form of attack, such as food 
tampering.  Food tampering is defined as the deliberate contamination of food with the 
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intent to cause harm.  Food tampering can be caused by an employee or former employee 
of the establishment.47  An example of this occurred in a supermarket in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan on December 31, 2003.48  This particular supermarket was forced to recall 
1,700 pounds of ground beef after 111 people fell ill with nicotine poisoning.49  It was 
discovered that an employee of the supermarket had deliberately contaminated the meat 
with insecticide.49  Many similar examples can be found with a simple Internet search. 
Food service establishments can also be targeted by customers, who may tamper 
with easy access self-service areas, such as buffets.47  An example of a customer 
tampering with a buffet is mentioned in a previous section, Introduction to Bioterrorism.  
The case of the Rajneeshees is mentioned as an example of bioterrorism, but it can also 
be used as an example of food tampering.  This particular group visited restaurants with 
salad bars and deliberately contaminated these salad bars with salmonella bacteria.4 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 80% of the foods consumed 
by Americans and is responsible for developing a plan to prevent food contamination, 
both deliberate and accidental.50  The FDA published a guidance document meant to 
provide security recommendations to facility operators in the food service industry, 
including producers, processors, transporters, and retailers.  This document provides 
suggestions in seven areas: management of food security, security of the physical facility, 
employee security, protection of computer systems, safety of raw materials and 
packaging, security of operations, and security of finished products.51  This document is 
freely available to the public. 
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Methodology 
Institutional Review Board 
Western Kentucky University (WKU) requires that all research involving human 
subjects must be approved by an independent Institutional Review Board (IRB).  In 
cooperation with this rule, permission to conduct the research was requested on June 20, 
2012.  IRB approval was granted on June 27, 2012 under reference code IRB12-312.  The 
IRB approval document can be viewed in Appendix A. 
 
Meat Processing Survey 
A survey was designed to assess security implementations and industry 
expectations of an agroterrorism or food tampering event for meat processing facilities 
and food service establishments.  The questionnaire for meat processing facilities was 
based on the General Food Defense Plan published by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA).52  No identifiable information was collected.  The first section of 
this questionnaire was designed to determine how familiar meat processing executives in 
Kentucky are with the concepts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism.  There were also 
questions in this section asking these executives to rate how likely they perceive an 
agroterrorism event is to occur both in general and at their facilities specifically, as well 
as whether or not each facility has a functional food defense plan in place.  The next ten 
sections assessed security in the following areas: outside security measures, shipment 
security, mail security, indoor security measures, slaughter/processing area security, 
water system security, hazardous material security, information security, employee/non-
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employee security, and incident response.  The questionnaire given to meat processing 
facilities is shown in Appendix B. 
 A phone call was administered to every meat processing facility (n = 61) 
published in the 2007 Directory of Kentucky Livestock Processors.  The call solicited 
participation in the survey.  If permission by the owner was obtained, an interview was 
scheduled with each owner or manager at his/her place of business.  If permission was 
denied, no further phone calls were made to the refusing facility.  A second round of 
phone calls was made to the facilities that were not contacted with the first round of 
phone calls.  If contact was made, participation in the survey was solicited.  If contact 
was not initiated, a final round of calls was made.  Eight appointments were made 
following the first round of calls, one appointment after the second round, and none after 
the final round.  Nine surveys in total were completed. 
The surveys were personally delivered and completed by the owner or manager in 
a private room.  Due to the secure nature of the survey, the completed survey was sealed 
in an envelope and locked in a box.  When the survey period was completed, the survey 
responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel file for analysis.  An attempt was made to 
do a statistical comparison of the responses based on the size of the facility.  
Unfortunately, only processing facilities that described themselves as ‘small’ completed 
the survey, so a statistical comparison was unable to be made.  An observational study 
was done instead. 
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Food Service Establishment Survey 
 The questionnaire given to food service establishments is shown in Appendix C.  
No identifiable information was collected.  The first section is similar to the first section 
of the questionnaire for meat processing facilities.  This section solicited information 
regarding the owners’/managers’ familiarity with bio- and agro-terrorism, as well as how 
secure they perceive their establishments to be.  It also enquired about the presence or 
lack of a functional food defense plan for the establishment.  The remaining sections 
assessed security in the following areas: general security measures, employee security, 
food security, hazardous materials security, information security, and incident response. 
 The target population for this study was all food service establishments in the 
state of Kentucky.  However, due to time and budget constraints, the actual population 
was all restaurants in Warren County, Kentucky.  The sampling frame was all food 
service establishments that have a food service permit on file at the Barren River District 
Health Department (BRDHD).   
Initially, a mail-based survey was attempted.  One hundred surveys, along with a 
self-addressed and stamped return envelope, were mailed to a random sample of food 
service establishments from the sampling frame.  Only four were completed and returned.  
Due to the poor return rate and the relatively high cost of mailing questionnaires, it was 
decided to attempt a different survey methodology. 
During the second attempt, the survey was administered to food service managers 
that attended a food manager certification course taught at the BRDHD during the 
months of December 2012 and January 2013.  Solicitation for participation in the survey 
was requested at the time of the course.  Completed surveys were collected at the end of 
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the course by either the researcher or the instructor of the course.  In total, 31 
questionnaires were completed during this time, for a total of 35 completed 
questionnaires.  The survey responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, 
and a statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurants was performed.  A 
students’ t test was used to compare means, and Fishers’ exact test was used to compare 
categorical data between the two groups. 
 
Results 
 
Meat Processing Facilities 
 
 Section 1: Type of Meat Processed 
In order to determine the size of the meat processing facility, the study 
participants were asked whether their facilities were small, medium, or large.  Only four 
of nine participants answered this question.  All of them answered they are ‘small’ 
facilities.  The study participants were also asked to name the meat products distributed 
by their facility.  They were given a list of meats to choose from: beef/veal, pork, poultry, 
sheep/lamb, other, and none.  Four of nine participants answered this question.  Table 1 
lists the products sold by these participants. 
 
Table 1. Products Distributed By Participating Meat Processing Facilities 
Product Number of Facilities Selling Product 
Beef/Veal 3 
Pork 3 
Poultry 3 
Sheep/Lamb 1 
Other 0 
None 0 
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Section 2: Agroterrorism 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine meat processing facility owners’ 
familiarity with the terms ‘bioterrorism’ and ‘agroterrorism’, as well as their concern that 
such an attack may occur against the U.S. and their facility specifically.  Questions one 
and two asked the participants to rank from one to four their familiarity with both terms, 
with one being “completely unfamiliar” and four being “completely familiar”.  Questions 
three and four asked the participants to rank from one to five their concern that a 
deliberate agroterrorism attack may occur against both the U.S. and their facility, with 
one implying “no concern” and five implying “extreme concern”.  The means and 
standard deviations from these questions are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Knowledge and Concern of Meat Processors Regarding an Agroterrorism Attack 
Question Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Familiarity with Bioterrorism 3.1 0.9 
Familiarity with Agroterrorism 3.0 1.1 
Concern About Agroterrorist Attack Against U.S. 2.7 0.7 
Concern About Agroterrorist Attack Against 
Facility 
1.7 0.7 
 
 Participants reported that they were on average ‘somewhat familiar’ with the 
terms ‘bioterrorism’ and ‘agroterrorism’.  They reported slight concern that an incidence 
of agroterrorism may occur against the U.S. and hardly any concern that an attack could 
happen to their facilities specifically.  Questions five and six asked participants if their 
facilities had ever been evaluated for security risks, and if not, if they were interested in 
undergoing such an evaluation.  Five facilities reported that they had undergone security 
evaluations, and three reported they had not.  Of those three, two were not interested in 
being evaluated and one was unsure. 
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Section 3: Outside Security Measures 
 
 This section sought to determine what sorts of physical security measures were 
implemented by meat processors to protect the facility itself.  This includes the main 
facility building, as well as any outside storage buildings that may be present.  Questions 
were asked regarding perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras and alarm systems, and the 
locking of doors and windows.  Table 3 shows the total number of responses regarding 
physical security at these meat processing facilities. 
 
Table 3. Meat Processors’ Responses Regarding Physical Security of the Premises 
Physical Security Type Facilities with Facilities without 
Perimeter Fencing 1 7 
Surveillance Cameras 1 7 
Locked Entrances 7 1 
Locked Windows/Air Vents 8 0 
Presence of Outdoor Storage 
Facilities 2 7 
Access to Outdoor Facilities 0 2 
Locked Entrances to Outdoor 
Facilities 0 2 
Alarm Systems 4 5 
Maintenance of Alarm Systems 3 2 
 
 Among the respondents, locking windows and doors of the facility was very 
commonly done.  Surveillance cameras and perimeter fencing were not very common.  
Alarm systems were utilized by approximately half the participating facilities.  Among 
those facilities with alarm systems, approximately half stated they were updated regularly 
according to the manufacturer’s instructions. 
 
 Section 4: Shipment Security 
 
 This section sought to determine the security procedures in place at the processing 
facilities for incoming and outgoing packages.  Participants were asked if packages were 
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examined before entering or exiting the facility, if vehicles were examined before 
entering or exiting the facility, and if loading docks were secured and monitored when in 
use.  Table 4 presents the total number of responses regarding security of shipments. 
 
Table 4. Security of Shipments Delivered and Received By Meat Processors 
Security Type Facilities with Facilities without 
Examination of Incoming 
Packages 7 2 
Examination of Outgoing 
Packages 8 1 
Examination of Incoming 
Vehicles 1 8 
Examination of Outgoing 
Vehicles 0 9 
Presence of a Loading Dock 3 6 
Security of Loading Dock 2 1 
 
 Among the respondents, it was common to examine packages both upon entering 
and exiting the facility.  It was not common to examine vehicles either upon entering or 
upon exiting.  Most facilities stated they did not have a loading dock.  Among those that 
did have a loading dock, two stated that the loading dock was secured and monitored, and 
one stated it was not. 
 
 Section 5: Mail Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine the facilities’ policies for handling 
suspicious mail.  Participants were asked if mail was examined for possible threats, if 
employees were trained to recognize suspicious mail, and if mail handling was done in a 
safe location.  This section included questions 30 through 33.  Question 33, which asked 
participants to elaborate on the procedure for handling suspicious mail, was a free 
response question.  Free response questions are questions where the participant is not 
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given answer choices.  The response to this question is documented in Appendix D.  The 
rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t 
know’.  Table 5 shows the total number of each response in this section for the non-free 
response questions. 
 
 
Table 5. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Meat Processors 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Safe Mail Handling 9 0 
Examination of Mail 5 4 
Employee Training 
Regarding the Safe Handling 
of Mail 2 7 
 
 All participants responded that mail handling was done in a safe location, away 
from any animal or meat processing activities that may be occurring.  Approximately half 
the respondents stated that they examined mail before opening it, and only two stated that 
employees at their facilities were trained to look for suspicious mail. 
 
 Section 6: Indoor Security Measures 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine what attempts were made by meat 
processing facilities to secure the inside of the facility.  Participants were asked about 
whether or not restricted areas of the facility were clearly marked, whether or not 
emergency lighting was present, and whether employees were familiar with any 
emergency exit policies that may be in place.  Questions regarding whether or not new 
materials brought into the facility were examined before use, as well as questions about 
inventory documentation were also asked in this section. 
 This section included questions 34 through 43.  One free response question asking 
participants how often they update their inventory is included. The rest of the questions in 
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this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 6 shows the 
total number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions. 
 
Table 6. Security of the Inside of Meat Processing Facilities 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Restricted Areas 2 7 
Examination of New or Unused 
Materials 7 1 
Documentation of Inventory 6 2 
Reporting of Unexpected 
Changes in Inventory 5 2 
Presence of Emergency Lighting 4 5 
Existence of Emergency Exit 
Policies 6 3 
Awareness of Employees of 
Emergency Exit Policies 4 0 
Periodic Emergency Drills 3 1 
Awareness of Emergency 
Response Personnel of 
Emergency Exit Policies 3 1 
 
 The majority of respondents stated that restricted areas of their facilities were not 
clearly marked.  Most of the respondents also stated that new materials entering the 
facility were examined before use, and that inventory was documented.  Just over half the 
respondents stated that unexpected changes in inventory would be reported to appropriate 
authorities.  Approximately half the facilities have emergency lighting in place, and 2/3 
of the respondents stated that their facilities had emergency exit policies.  Of those that 
have emergency exit policies, only one stated that their employees were unfamiliar with 
them. 
 Question 37 asked respondents how often they updated their inventory.  Six 
participants responded to this question.  The responses were highly variable, ranging 
from those that update inventory every day to those that update every 90 days.  The 
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average number of days between updates was 22.7 days, with a standard deviation of 
34.7 days. 
  
Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine the security measures in place in the 
slaughtering area, for those facilities that store live animals, and the processing area.  
Respondents were asked whether live animals were stored at their facilities.  For those 
that answered in the affirmative, questions were asked regarding whether animals were 
inspected, whether screening was performed to detect diseased animals, and what policies 
were in place when a diseased animal was discovered.  Questions regarding access to 
animals and animal records were also addressed in this section.  For any facilities with 
active meat processing, questions were asked about access to the meat products, testing 
of meat products, and inventory documentation of any non-meat products used in food 
meant for human or animal consumption. 
 This section included questions 44 through 76.  Questions 45 through 67 were 
only answered by those respondents that stated live animals were stored at their facilities.  
Free response questions asking participants which institutions were alerted when a 
disease animal was discovered, other procedures used for responding to a diseased 
animal, and how long purchase receipts are kept onsite are included.  The responses to 
these questions are documented in Appendix D.  The rest of the questions in this section 
required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 7 shows the total 
number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions. 
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Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors 
Security Type Facilities With 
Facilities 
Without 
Storage of Live Animals 4 5 
Federal Inspection of Stored Animals 4 0 
Abnormal Behavior Screening 4 0 
Slaughter of Diseased Animal 0 3 
Laboratory Testing of Disease Animal 4 0 
Quarantine of Remaining Animals 2 1 
Restricted Access to Animals 3 1 
Recording of Visitation to Animal Storage 1 3 
Recording of Stored Animals 4 0 
Recording of Animal Purchase Site 2 2 
Recording of Animal Purchase Date 2 2 
Onsite Maintenance of Records 2 2 
Visitor Access to Animal Storage Facilities 1 3 
Requirement of Visitors to Animal Storage to Sign In 0 2 
Accompaniment of Visitors to Animal Storage by 
Appropriate Personnel 2 0 
Performing of Animal Slaughter 4 0 
Restriction of Access to Slaughtering Area 4 0 
Recording of Visitation to Slaughtering Area 1 3 
Recording of Specific Animal Slaughtered 4 0 
Recording of Date of Slaughter 4 0 
Periodic Testing on Slaughtered Animals 4 0 
Access of Non-Employees to Slaughtering Areas 2 2 
Requirement of Non-Employees to Sign In When 
Visiting Slaughtering Area 0 2 
Accompaniment of Non-Employees to Slaughtering 
Facility by Appropriate Personnel 2 0 
Restriction of Access to Animal Control Equipment 2 0 
Storage of Meat Products 8 1 
Restriction of Access to Meat Products 8 0 
Recording of Inventory of Date of Storage of Meat 
Products 6 2 
Periodic Testing of Meat Products 5 3 
Storage of Non-Meat Products used in Food 6 3 
Restriction of Access to Non-Meat Products 6 0 
Recording of Non-Meat Product Purchase Site 6 0 
Recording of Non-Meat Product Purchase Date 6 0 
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Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors 
Security Type Facilities With 
Facilities 
Without 
Recording of Non-Meat Product Storage Date 6 0 
Periodic Examination of Non-Meat Products 6 0 
 
Four respondents stated that live animals were stored on their facilities.  At these 
facilities, all animals are inspected by a veterinarian, and all animals are screened for 
symptoms of disease.  If disease is found, the animals are not slaughtered but are instead 
sent away for laboratory testing.  Other animals in the facility are quarantined and tested.  
Access to the animals is restricted by all but one facility. 
 All respondents with live animal storage state that records are maintained for 
every animal stored at the facility.  Two facilities stated that these records included where 
and when the animal was purchased.  Two respondents stated that purchase receipts for 
animals were maintained onsite and kept for a range of one to seven years.  All four 
respondents keep records regarding which animals are slaughtered and when, and each 
respondent conducts periodic testing on slaughtered animals.  Two of the facilities 
allowed visitor access to the slaughtering area.  Neither of these facilities required visitors 
to sign in when entering the area, although both facilities stated that any visitors are 
accompanied by appropriate personnel. 
 All but one respondent stated that meat products were stored at their facilities.  Of 
these respondents, all stated that access to the meat products was restricted.  Inventory 
records regarding the date of storage for the meat products is available for 75% of 
respondents.  Five respondents stated that periodic testing was performed on meat 
products to detect disease and ensure quality.  Six respondents stated that ingredients 
other than meat were stored in the facility.  Of these respondents, all six stated that access 
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to these ingredients was restricted, and that inventory records were kept regarding the 
company the ingredients were purchased from, the date of purchase, and the date of 
storage.  All six respondents stated that periodic examination of the ingredients was 
performed to check for evidence of tampering. 
 
 Section 8: Water System Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine the policies for securing the water 
systems present at each meat processing facility.  The systems included in this section 
were potable water storage tanks, water reuse systems, transfer lines, and ice-making 
equipment.  This section included questions 78 through 89.  The questions in this section 
required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 8 shows the total 
number of each response in this section for each question. 
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Table 8. Security of Water Systems By Meat Processors 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Presence of Storage 
Tanks of Potable Water 1 8 
Restriction of Access to 
Potable Water Tanks 1 0 
Examination of Potable 
Water Tanks 1 0 
Periodic Testing of 
Water in Potable Water 
Tanks 1 0 
Presence of Water Reuse 
System 9 0 
Restriction of Access to 
Water Reuse System 0 0 
Monitoring of Water 
Reuse System 0 0 
Use of Transfer Lines 2 7 
Restriction of Access to 
Transfer Lines 1 1 
Examination of Transfer 
Lines 1 1 
Use of Ice Making 
Equipment 1 8 
Restriction of Access to 
Ice Making Equipment 1 0 
 
 Only one respondent stated that storage tanks of potable water were in use at that 
facility.  This respondent stated that access to the storage tanks was restricted, and the 
tanks were monitored for evidence of tampering.  No facilities reported use of a water 
reuse system.  Two facilities reported use of transfer lines for moving water or feed.  Of 
these two facilities, one reported that access to the lines was restricted and that the lines 
were periodically examined for evidence of tampering.  One respondent reported use of 
ice-making equipment.  This respondent stated that access to the ice-making equipment 
was restricted. 
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Section 9: Hazardous Material Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine the policies regarding storage and 
disposal of hazardous materials for meat processing facilities.  Questions regarding 
access to stored hazardous materials were also posed in this section.  This section 
included questions 90 through 95.  One free response questions asking participants what 
their procedures were for handling inconsistencies in their inventory of hazardous 
materials was included.  Responses to this question are documented in Appendix D. The 
rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t 
know’.  Table 9 shows the total number of each response in this section for the non-free 
response questions. 
 
Table 9. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste By Meat Processors 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Storage of Hazardous Materials 2 7 
Restriction of Access to 
Hazardous Materials 2 0 
Documentation of Inventory of 
Hazardous Materials 0 2 
Proper Disposal of Hazardous 
Waste 5 2 
Restriction of Access to 
Hazardous Waste 5 1 
 
 Only two respondents reported the storage of bulk quantities of hazardous 
materials at their facilities.  Both facilities restrict access to the hazardous materials, but 
neither keeps an inventory of the materials in use at the facility.  Five facilities reported 
the proper disposal of hazardous waste.  These five facilities also reported that access to 
hazardous wasted was restricted.  Two respondents stated that hazardous waste was not 
properly disposed of at their facilities, and one respondent stated that access to the 
hazardous waste was not restricted. 
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Section 10: Information Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to analyze methods for securing information and 
computer systems in meat processing facilities.  Respondents were asked about 
controlling access to documents regarding facility layout, processing procedures, and 
inventory documentation.  Respondents were also asked whether or not they secured their 
computer systems with passwords, firewalls, and virus protection.  This section included 
questions 96 through 102.  The questions in this section required an answer of either 
‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 10 shows the total number of each response in this 
section for each question. 
 
Table 10. Security of Information Stored at Meat Processing Facilities 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Restriction of Access to 
Information About Facility 
Layout 6 3 
Restriction of Access to 
Information About Facility 
Processing 8 1 
Restriction of Access to 
Inventory Documentation 8 1 
Use of Computer System 6 3 
Password Protection 6 0 
Use of Firewall 5 0 
Use of Virus Protection Software 5 0 
 
 Six respondents reported that access to information regarding facility layout was 
restricted.  Eight respondents reported that access to information regarding processing 
procedures and inventory documentation was restricted.  Six respondents reported use of 
a computer system in their facilities.  Of these respondents, all six reported that 
passwords were required to access the system, and five reported use of a firewall and 
virus protection software. 
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 Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine what requirements are in place for 
employees and visitors of meat processing facilities in order to promote safety and 
security.  Respondents were asked if employees and visitors were required to wear 
identification materials or sign in and out when entering or exiting the facility.  Questions 
asking about restricting the use of cameras and cell phones with cameras and background 
checks and security training for new employees were also posed in this section.  This 
section included questions 103 through 114.  The questions in this section required an 
answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 11 shows the total number of each 
response in this section for each question. 
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Table 11. Security of Employees and Non-Employees By Meat Processing Facilities 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Identification Materials on 
Employees 1 8 
Requirement of Employees to 
Sign In and Out 5 4 
Background Checks for 
Employees 4 5 
Restriction of Use of Cameras 
and Cell Phones for Employees 3 6 
Requirement of Security 
Training 2 7 
Interest in Providing Security 
Training 1 6 
Availability of Information On 
Threat Response Policies for 
Employees 4 4 
Requirement of Employees to 
Report Suspicious Activity 8 1 
Timely Investigation of 
Employee Reports 7 0 
Requirement of Visitors to 
Sign In 2 6 
Requirement of Identification 
Materials For Visitors 1 7 
Restriction of Cameras and 
Cell Phones for Visitors 3 5 
 
 Eight respondents stated that employees were not required to wear identification 
materials.  Five facilities require employees to sign in and out when entering and exiting 
the facility.  Four facilities require background checks, and two facilities provide security 
training for new employees.  Of the seven facilities that do not provide security training, 
only one respondent expressed interest in providing such training in the future.  Three 
facilities restrict employees and visitors from carrying cameras or cell phones with 
cameras onto facility grounds.  All facilities but one require employees to report 
suspicious activity, and all respondents reported that employee reports are investigated 
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immediately.  Only two facilities require visitors to sign in when entering the facility, and 
only one facility requires visitors to wear identification materials. 
 
 Section 12: Incident Response 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine whether meat processing facilities 
have policies in place to deal with an actual incidence of terrorism.  Respondents were 
asked about quarantine procedures and food recall plans.  They were also asked if 
emergency contact information was kept up to date.  This section included questions 115 
through 118.  The questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I 
don’t know’.  Table 12 shows the total number of each response in this section for each 
question. 
 
Table 12. Incident Response By Meat Processing Facilities 
Security Type Facilities With Facilities Without 
Existence of Product 
Quarantine Procedures 7 2 
Existence of Food Recall 
Plan 8 1 
Testing of Food Recall Plan 4 4 
Up-To-Date Emergency and 
Personnel Contact 
Information 8 0 
 
 Seven respondents reported that they did have policies in place to quarantine 
animals when an attack is suspected.  Eight respondents reported having a food recall 
plan, although only four respondents reported having tested their plan.  Eight respondents 
reported that all emergency contact information was kept up to date. 
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Food Service Establishments 
  
Section 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 This section asked participants to describe the type of food service establishment 
they worked for.  The types included in the section were chain restaurant, non-chain 
restaurant, school or child day care cafeteria, hospital or long-term care facility, hotel or 
bed and breakfast, and other.  This section was completed by 30 respondents.  Table 13 
shows the distribution of respondents. 
 
Table 13. Distribution of Food Service Establishments 
Type Number of Respondents 
Chain Restaurant 5 
Non-chain Restaurant 7 
School/Child Day Care Cafeteria 9 
Hospital/Long Term Care Cafeteria 3 
Hotel/Bed and Breakfast 1 
Other 5 
Unanswered 5 
Total 35 
 
 The data from this section was used as a basis for comparison during the rest of 
the analysis.  Two groups composing of restaurants (chain and non-chain) and non-
restaurants (schools, hospitals, hotels, and others) were created.  A comparison of these 
two groups was conducted. 
 
 Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense 
 
 This section sought to determine familiarity with the term “bioterrorism”, concern 
about an incidence of food tampering, and concern about food defense among food 
permit holders in Warren County, Kentucky.  The first, third, and sixth questions required 
participants to rank from one to four their familiarity with bioterrorism, food tampering, 
and the Guidance Document, with a rank of one implying complete unfamiliarity and 
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four implying complete familiarity.  The second, fourth, and fifth questions required 
participants to rank from one to five their concern about a bioterrorism attack against the 
U.S., a food tampering incident in their establishment, and food defense for their 
establishment, with one implying no concern and five implying extreme concern.  The 
mean and standard deviation for each of these questions are listed in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Concern About Bioterrorism, Food Tampering, and Food Defense Expressed 
By Food Service Establishments 
Question  Mean for 
Restaurants 
Standard 
Deviation for 
Restaurants 
Mean for 
Non-
Restaurants 
Standard 
Deviation for 
Non-
Restaurants 
Familiarity with 
Bioterrorism 
2 1.1 2.9 0.9 
Concern About 
Bioterrorism 
Attack Against 
U.S. 
2 1.7 3.4 1.4 
Concern About 
Food Tampering 
Incident in U.S. 
2.5 1.0 2.8 0.8 
Concern About 
Food Tampering 
Event in 
Establishment 
1.5 1.9 1.5 1.0 
Concern With 
Food Defense 
1 1.7 1.8 1.3 
Familiarity with 
Guidance 
Document 
1.5 1.2 2.1 1.2 
 
A student’s t-test was used to compare the means for each of the two groups 
under discussion.  The results of these analyses are shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Probabilities Associated with Students’ t Analysis of Table 14 
Question p-value 
Familiarity with Bioterrorism 0.5 
Concern About Bioterrorism Attack Against U.S. 1.0 
Concern About Food Tampering Incident in U.S. 0.8 
Concern About Food Tampering Event in Establishment* 0.05 
Concern With Food Defense* 0.08 
Familiarity with Guidance Document 0.5 
*Implies statistical significance 
 
Since the sample size was so small, a higher than usual level of significance, 0.1, 
was used throughout this analysis.  At a significance level of 0.1, it was determined that 
there was a significant difference in the two groups for questions four and five.  
Restaurant managers are less concerned about a targeted food tampering incident in their 
establishment and less concerned about food defense overall than non-restaurants. 
The final question in this section inquired whether food permit holders would be 
interested in reviewing “Guidance Document for Retail Food Stores and Food 
Establishments” published by the FDA.  This document provides recommendations on 
food defense for food service establishments.  Participants were asked to respond with 
‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  In the restaurant group, seven participants responded ‘yes’, 
three responded ‘no’, and three responded ‘I don’t know’.  In the non-restaurant group, 
eleven participants responded ‘yes’, one responded ‘no’, and six responded ‘I don’t 
know’.  To simplify analysis, those that responded ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’ were 
combined.  A Fisher’s exact analysis was used to compare the groups and resulted in a p-
value of 0.5.  There is no significant difference in the interest level for reviewing this 
document between the two groups. 
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Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense 
 
This section compared managerial responsibilities for food defense between the 
restaurant and non-restaurant groups.  Questions enquired about food defense plans, 
availability of contact information for the police department, fire department, ambulance, 
the public health department, and homeland security, and whether managers encouraged 
staff to be vigilant about food tampering.  Each question in this section required an 
answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  This section comprised questions eight 
through seventeen of Appendix C.  Table 16 shows the total number of each response in 
Section 3. 
 
Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service 
Establishments 
Type of Security 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No 
I don't 
know 
Existence of Food Defense Plan 5 4 3 5 7 6 
Familiarity with Food Defense Plan 3 2 0 3 1 1 
Exercise of Food Defense Plan 
Within One Year 3 2 0 3 1 1 
Periodic Security Inspections by 
Manager or Designated Employee 10 2 0 12 5 1 
Familiarity with Contact 
Information for Police 12 0 0 16 0 2 
Familiarity with Contact 
Information for Fire Department 12 0 0 16 0 2 
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Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service 
Establishments 
Type of Security 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No 
I don't 
know 
Familiarity with Contact 
Information for Ambulance 12 0 0 16 0 2 
Familiarity with Contact 
Information for Public Health 
Department 
11 1 0 16 1 1 
Familiarity with Contact 
Information for Homeland Security 
Agency 
4 4 4 10 3 5 
Encouragement of Vigilance in Staff 
Members 11 0 1 15 1 2 
Awareness of Employees of 
Manager to Report to 11 0 1 13 1 4 
Timely Investigation of Staff 
Reports 11 0 1 14 0 4 
Presence of “Person in Charge” 9 3 0 15 1 2 
Restriction of Employees With 
Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 11 1 0 15 2 1 
 
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups.  For 
statistical analysis, those that responded ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’ were combined.  They 
were combined in this way in all following Fisher’s analyses.  Table 17 shows the results 
of the Fisher’s analysis for each question in this section. 
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Table 17. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 16 
Security Type p-value 
Existence of Food Defense Plan 0.5 
Familiarity with Food Defense Plan 1.0 
Exercise of Food Defense Plan Within One Year 1.0 
Periodic Security Inspections by Manager or Designated Employee 0.4 
Familiarity with Contact Information for Police 0.5 
Familiarity with Contact Information for Fire Department 0.5 
Familiarity with Contact Information for Ambulance 0.5 
Familiarity with Contact Information for Public Health Department 1.0 
Familiarity with Contact Information for Homeland Security Agency 0.3 
Encouragement of Vigilance in Staff Members 0.6 
Awareness of Employees of Manager to Report to 0.4 
Timely Investigation of Staff Reports 0.6 
Presence of “Person in Charge” 0.7 
Restriction of Employees With Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 0.6 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the 
two groups. 
 
 Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine what the responsibilities and 
requirements for staff were in each establishment.  Respondents answered questions 
regarding background checks for new employees, staff uniforms, access to employee-
only restricted areas, and security training for employees.  Questions regarding security 
training included whether or not employees were trained to monitor for suspicious 
activity and foodborne illness.  This section contains questions 18 through 30.  Each 
question in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  
Questions 23 and 24, which asked about restricted areas, had an additional option of ‘Not 
Applicable’ for those establishments without restricted areas.  Table 18 shows the total 
number of each response in Section 4. 
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Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service 
Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No 
I 
don't 
know 
Not 
Applicable Yes No 
I 
don't 
know 
Not 
Applicable 
Background 
Checks 6 6 0 ~ 16 1 0 ~ 
Identification 
Materials For 
Staff 9 3 0 ~ 12 6 0 ~ 
Uniforms For 
Staff 11 1 0 ~ 15 3 0 ~ 
Collection of 
Identification 
Materials 
From Former 
Staff 10 2 0 ~ 9 6 3 ~ 
Documentation 
of Which 
Employees Are 
Working 11 1 0 ~ 16 2 0 ~ 
Clearly 
Marked 
Restricted 
Areas* 6 3 0 3 13 2 0 3 
Access to 
Restricted 
Areas For 
Necessary 
Employees 
Only* 7 1 0 4 13 2 0 3 
Security 
Training 3 7 2 ~ 7 11 0 ~ 
 Availability of 
Threat 
Response 
Information 6 4 2 ~ 13 2 3 ~ 
*This question had an additional option of ‘Not Applicable’ for those establishments without restricted areas. 
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Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service 
Establishments 
Security 
Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No 
I 
don't 
know 
Not 
Applicable Yes No 
I 
don't 
know 
Not 
Applicable 
Requirement 
of 
Employees 
to Report 
Suspicious 
Activity 12 0 0 ~ 15 0 3 ~ 
Monitoring 
For Unusual 
Activity 
Conducted 
by Staff 11 0 1 ~ 14 1 2 ~ 
Foodborne 
Illness 
Training 
Provided 
For Staff 8 3 1 ~ 12 1 4 ~ 
Requirement 
to Report 
Symptoms of 
Foodborne 
Illness 12 0 0 ~ 15 2 1 ~ 
 
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups.  Those that 
responded ‘Not Applicable’ in questions 23 and 24 were left out of the analysis for those 
specific questions.  Table 19 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each question 
in this section. 
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Table 19. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Section 4 
Security Type p-value 
Background Checks* 0.01 
Identification Materials For Staff 0.7 
Uniforms For Staff 0.6 
Collection of Identification Materials From Former Staff* 0.1 
Documentation of Which Employees Are Working 0.3 
Clearly Marked Restricted Areas 1.0 
Access to Restricted Areas For Necessary Employees Only 1.0 
Security Training 0.7 
Availability of Threat Response Information 0.3 
Requirement of Employees to Report Suspicious Activity 0.3 
Monitoring For Unusual Activity Conducted by Staff 0.6 
Foodborne Illness Training Provided For Staff 1.0 
Requirement to Report Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 0.3 
*Implies statistical significance 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were 
found in the questions regarding background checks and collection of identification 
materials.  The percentage of establishments in the non-restaurant group that require 
background checks on new employees is significantly higher than in the restaurant group.  
The percentage of establishments that collect name tags, uniforms, or other means of 
identifying employees after the employee is no longer employed at the establishment is 
significantly higher in the restaurant group.  
 
Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine what the policies for dealing with 
customers and visitors were for each establishment.  For this survey, a ‘visitor’ was 
defined as “those that are present in an official capacity, including but not limited to 
delivery staff, health inspectors, contractors, or sales representatives.”  Questions 
included customer and visitor restrictions, as well as policies for accepting visitors such 
as requiring proper identification and maintaining records of all official visitations.  Each 
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question in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 
20 shows the total number of each response in Section 5. 
 
Table 20. Security of Customer and Visitors to Food Service Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No I don't know 
Restriction of 
Customers 
From Food 
Preparation 
Areas 12 0 0 15 2 1 
Proper 
Identification 
Required For 
Visitors 11 1 0 16 2 0 
Documentation 
Regarding 
Purpose of 
Visitor 
Required 8 4 0 12 4 1 
Requirement 
For Visitors to 
Sign In 1 11 0 10 4 4 
Availability of 
Documentation 
of Visitor 
Access 2 8 1 11 3 3 
Accompaniment 
of Visitors by 
Appropriate 
Personnel 10 2 0 14 1 2 
 
 A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups.  Table 21 
shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each question in Section 5. 
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Table 21. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 20 
Security Type p-value 
Restriction of Customers From Food Preparation Areas 0.3 
Proper Identification Required For Visitors 1.0 
Documentation Regarding Purpose of Visitor Required 1.0 
Requirement For Visitors to Sign In* 0.02 
Availability of Documentation of Visitor Access* 0.02 
Accompaniment of Visitors by Appropriate Personnel 1.0 
*Implies statistical significance 
  
At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were 
found in the questions regarding visitor sign-in requirements and visitor access 
documentation.  A higher percentage of establishments in the non-restaurant group 
require visitors to sign in than in the restaurant group.  A higher percentage of 
establishments in the non-restaurant group maintain records of each time an official 
visitation occurs than in the restaurant group. 
 
 Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine what steps establishment managers 
take to ensure the physical security of the property.  Questions in this section enquire 
about locking and securing entrances and windows, whether or not surveillance cameras 
and alarm systems are in use, and the security of any outdoor storage facilities that may 
be present at each establishment.  This section included questions 37 through 50 of 
Appendix C.  Several free response questions asking participants to elaborate on how 
they ensured all doors and windows were locked, how often they ensured their alarm 
system was working, and any other security measures they used to prevent unauthorized 
entry were included in this section.  The responses to these questions are documented in 
Appendix E.  The rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, 
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‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 22 shows the total number of each response in this section 
for the non-free response questions. 
 
Table 22. Physical Security of Food Service Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No I don't know 
Locked 
Entrances 11 1 0 15 2 1 
Locked 
Windows/Air 
Vents 10 2 0 11 4 3 
Surveillance 
Cameras Inside 8 4 0 11 7 0 
Surveillance 
Cameras 
Outside 6 6 0 10 7 1 
Alarm Systems 6 6 0 11 4 3 
Appropriate 
Maintenance of 
Alarm Systems 8 1 1 9 0 2 
Presence of 
Outdoor 
Storage 
Facilities 5 7 0 9 7 2 
Restriction of 
Access to 
Storage 
Facilities 6 0 0 8 0 2 
Locking of 
Storage 
Facilities 6 0 0 8 0 2 
 
 A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each non-
free response question.  Table 23 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each non-
free response question in Section 6. 
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Table 23: Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 22 
Security Type p-value 
Locked Entrances 0.6 
Locked Windows/Air Vents 0.2 
Surveillance Cameras Inside 1.0 
Surveillance Cameras Outside 1.0 
Alarm Systems 0.7 
Appropriate Maintenance of Alarm Systems 1.0 
Presence of Outdoor Storage Facilities 0.7 
Restriction of Access to Storage Facilities 0.5 
Locking of Storage Facilities 0.5 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the 
two groups. 
 
 Section 7: Food Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies for 
potential targets of a food tampering incident, such as food delivery, food storage, and 
food preparation activities.  This section also sought to determine which establishments 
keep a food inventory, what the inventory contains, and how often it is updated.  This 
section included questions 51 through 73 of Appendix C.  Free response questions asking 
participants to elaborate on their establishments’ policies for receiving unexpected food 
in a delivery, their procedures for inconsistencies discovered in inventory records, and 
their policies for discovering unlabeled food were included.  The responses to these 
questions are documented in Appendix D.  The rest of the questions in this section 
required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 24 shows the total 
number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions. 
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Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No 
I don't 
know 
Delivery of Food by Approved 
Sources 12 0 0 12 3 0 
Inspection of Delivered Food By 
Employees 12 0 0 15 1 0 
Inventory Documentation 
Available 12 0 0 14 2 0 
Inventory Includes Which Foods 
Delivered 12 0 0 15 0 1 
Inventory Includes Food 
Purchase Site 10 1 1 15 0 1 
Inventory Includes Food Storage 
Date 12 0 0 12 2 2 
Inventory Includes Food Storage 
Location 12 0 0 13 1 2 
Inventory Includes Food 
Expiration Date 11 1 0 11 3 1 
Appropriate Labeling of Foods 12 0 0 16 0 0 
Inspection of Stored Foods By 
Employees 12 0 0 15 0 1 
Appropriate Storage of Foods 
According to FDA Guidelines 12 0 0 15 0 1 
Appropriate Preparation of 
Foods According to FDA 
Guidelines 
12 0 0 15 0 1 
Foods with Potential For 
Contamination Stored Separately 12 0 0 14 1 1 
Laboratory Testing of 
Contaminated Foods 2 8 2 3 8 4 
Discarding of Expired Foods 12 0 0 16 0 0 
Cleaning of Equipment Before 
Each Use 12 0 0 16 0 0 
Separate Storage of Different 
Foods 12 0 0 16 0 0 
Bulk Products Stored in Easily 
Monitored Areas 4 7 0 12 4 0 
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Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No 
I don't 
know 
Appropriate Cleaning of 
Foods Before Use 12 0 0 13 1 2 
Presence of Self-Service Areas 2 9 1 9 5 0 
Monitoring of Self-Service 
Areas 3 0 0 9 0 0 
Presence of Vending 
Machines 0 12 0 9 7 0 
Restriction of Access to 
Vending Machine Products 0 0 0 8 1 0 
 
 
 A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each non-
free response question.  Table 25 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each non-
free response question in Section 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Table 25. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 24 
Security Type p-value 
Delivery of Food by Approved Sources 0.2 
Inspection of Delivered Food By Employees 1.0 
Inventory Documentation Available 0.5 
Inventory Includes Which Foods Delivered 1.0 
Inventory Includes Food Purchase Site 0.6 
Inventory Includes Food Storage Date* 0.1 
Inventory Includes Food Storage Location 0.2 
Inventory Includes Food Expiration Date 0.3 
Appropriate Labeling of Foods 1.0 
Inspection of Stored Foods By Employees 1.0 
Appropriate Storage of Foods According to FDA Guidelines 1.0 
Appropriate Preparation of Foods According to FDA Guidelines 1.0 
Foods with Potential For Contamination Stored Separately 0.5 
Laboratory Testing of Contaminated Foods 1.0 
Discarding of Expired Foods 1.0 
Cleaning of Equipment Before Each Use 1.0 
Separate Storage of Different Foods 1.0 
Bulk Products Stored in Easily Monitored Areas* 0.06 
Appropriate Cleaning of Foods Before Use 0.2 
Presence of Self-Service Areas* 0.05 
Monitoring of Self-Service Areas 1.0 
Presence of Vending Machines* 0.002 
Restriction of Access to Vending Machine Products^ ~ 
*Implies statistical significance 
^ As there was no response from the restaurant group for this question, a Fisher’s exact 
analysis could not be performed. 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were 
found in the questions that asked about food storage dates, bulk products, presence of 
self-service areas, and presence of vending machines.  A higher percentage of restaurants 
keep a food inventory that documents when foods are stored than non-restaurants.  A 
higher percentage of non-restaurants keep food products stored in bulk in easily-
monitored public areas than restaurants.  A higher percentage of non-restaurants contain 
self-service areas, such as buffets and salad bars, and vending machines than restaurants. 
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 Question 56 asked participants to state how often their establishment updates the 
food inventory.  The average and standard deviation of the number of days between 
updates was determined for each of the two groups.  This is displayed in Table 26. 
 
Table 26. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Number of Days between Inventory 
Updates for Restaurants and Non-Restaurants 
Group Mean Number of Days Between 
Updates 
Standard Deviation (Number of 
Days) 
Restaurants 4.9 2.7 
Non-
Restaurants 
17.8 16.8 
 
 A students’ t test was performed to compare the means between the two groups.  
A p-value of 0.02 resulted from this analysis.  At a significance level of 0.1, it is 
determined that there is a significant difference in the number of days between inventory 
updates between restaurants and non-restaurants.  On average, restaurants update their 
inventory more often. 
 
 Section 8: Mail Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies for 
handling suspicious mail.  Questions in this section enquired about where mail was 
handled, whether or not mail was examined before opening, and what the procedures 
were when suspicious mail was discovered.  This section included questions 74 through 
77 of Appendix C.  One free response question asking participants to elaborate on their 
procedures for handling suspicious mail was included.  The responses to this question are 
documented in Appendix E.  The rest of the questions in this section required an answer 
of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 27 shows the total number of each response 
in this section for the non-free response questions. 
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Table 27. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Food Service Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No I don't know 
Appropriate 
Location for 
Mail Handling 8 2 2 15 1 0 
Examination of 
Mail 7 4 1 9 1 6 
Training of 
Employees For 
Mail Handling 4 7 1 4 5 7 
 
 A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each non-
free response question.  Table 28 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each non-
free response question in Section 8. 
 
Table 28. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 27 
Security Type p-value 
Appropriate Location for Mail Handling* 0.1 
Examination of Mail 1.0 
Training of Employees For Mail Handling 0.7 
*Implies statistical significance 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, a significant difference was found between the two 
groups for question 74.  A higher percentage of non-restaurants handle the mail away 
from food preparation areas than restaurants. 
 
 Section 9: Hazardous Materials 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies on 
storing and disposing of hazardous materials.  Questions in this section enquired about 
whether these types of materials were stored, and if so, whether or not an inventory of 
these materials was kept and if these materials were disposed of properly.  This section 
included questions 78 through 83 of Appendix D.  One free response question asking 
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participants to elaborate on their procedures for inconsistencies discovered in their 
inventory of hazardous materials was included.  The responses to this question are 
documented in Appendix E.  The rest of the questions in this section required an answer 
of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 29 shows the total number of each response 
in this section for the non-free response questions. 
 
Table 29. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste in Food Service Establishments 
Security Type 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No I don't know 
Storage of 
Hazardous 
Materials 4 7 0 15 1 0 
Restriction of 
Access to 
Hazardous 
Materials 4 0 0 13 0 0 
Documentation 
of Inventory 
For Hazardous 
Materials 3 1 0 13 1 1 
Proper 
Disposal of 
Hazardous 
Waste 10 0 1 13 0 2 
Restriction of 
Access to 
Hazardous 
Waste 10 0 1 13 1 2 
 
 A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each non-
free response question.  Table 30 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each non-
free response question in Section 9. 
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Table 30. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 29 
Security Type p-value 
Storage of Hazardous Materials 1.0 
Restriction of Access to Hazardous Materials 0.5 
Documentation of Inventory For Hazardous Materials 0.6 
Proper Disposal of Hazardous Waste 0.6 
Restriction of Access to Hazardous Waste 1.0 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the 
two groups. 
 
 Section 10: Information Security 
 
 The purpose of this section was to determine the security of information and 
computer systems for each establishment.  Questions in this section enquired about 
access to inventory documents and security of computer systems, including inquiries 
about password protection, firewalls, and virus protection for the computer.  This section 
contains questions 84 through 88.  Each question in this section required an answer of 
either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.  Table 31 shows the total number of each response in 
this section. 
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Table 31. Security of Information Kept By Food Service Establishments 
Security 
Training 
Restaurant Group Non-Restaurant Group 
Yes No I don't know Yes No I don't know 
Restriction of 
Access to 
Inventory 
Documentation 10 2 0 13 0 3 
Use of 
Computer 
System 8 4 0 16 0 0 
Use of Password 
Protection 7 1 0 15 0 1 
Use of Firewall 7 0 0 12 0 4 
Use of Virus 
Protection 
Software 7 0 0 13 0 3 
 
 A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each non-
free response question.  Table 32 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each non-
free response question in Section 10. 
 
Table 32: Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus Non-
Restaurants in Table 31 
Security Type p-value 
Restriction of Access to Inventory Documentation 1.0 
Use of Computer System* 0.02 
Use of Password Protection 1.0 
Use of Firewall 0.3 
Use of Virus Protection Software 1.0 
*Implies statistical significance 
 
 At a significance level of 0.1, a significant difference between the two groups was 
found for question 85.  A higher percentage of non-restaurants utilize a computer system 
than restaurants. 
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Discussion 
Meat Processing Facilities 
 Section 1: Study Design 
Before getting started with this portion of the project, it was understood that data 
collection would be difficult.  It was assumed that there would be some resistance on the 
part of the processors to give out potentially compromising security information.  To 
combat this, a face-to-face survey was designed with the thought that the processors may 
be more likely to trust someone they could speak with directly.  It was also thought that a 
face-to-face survey would be the best way to ensure a large enough sample size.  In order 
to boost the legitimacy of the survey, the processors were given the names and contact 
information of everyone involved in the project, including the researcher, the research 
advisor, and the Institutional Review Board.  An incentive of the chance to win one of 
two iPod Touches was also included. 
 Despite all of this, it was very difficult to solicit participation.  Several common 
reasons for refusal were given at the time of first contact by telephone.  Many processors 
were uninterested in the research itself, and therefore had no interest in participating.  
Many felt that they were too busy to take any time out of their day to complete a survey.  
Most commonly, many processors felt that their operation was too small to attract 
attention for potential attack.  Those that cited this reason felt that it was unnecessary for 
them to participate in research concerning terrorism in the meat industry.  Several meat 
processing facilities stated that their businesses had closed as a result of the economic 
downturn.  It is possible that other facilities in the sampling population had similarly 
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closed.  For these reasons, although 61 meat processors were solicited, only nine agreed 
to participate in the research. 
 Originally, a statistical comparison of meat processing facilities was planned 
based on the size of the operation: small, medium, or large.  Unfortunately, the question 
(D1 of Appendix B) that asked the respondent to classify his/her operation by size was 
printed on the back of the title page, making it very difficult to see.  Many respondents 
were unaware of this question.  As a result, only four respondents answered it, and each 
responded with ‘small’.  Due to the low response rate and the lack of variability of the 
size classification question, a statistical comparison could not be made.  Instead, an 
observational study was conducted. 
 The questionnaire for this portion of the project was divided up into twelve 
sections, each with its own underlying theme.  This chapter will follow the questionnaire, 
with a discussion of each section separately. 
 
 Section 2: Agroterrorism 
 A deliberate attack by terrorists on agriculture has potentially devastating 
economic and public health impacts.  This section was designed to quantify the 
familiarity of meat processors about the concepts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism, as 
well as to quantify their concern that such an attack will occur against the U.S. or against 
their operations specifically.  The processors professed a modest familiarity with these 
concepts but were generally unconcerned that an attack would occur, either against the 
U.S. or their own operations.  Slightly more concern was expressed that an attack would 
occur against the U.S. than their operations.  This lack of concern is reflective of the 
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general attitude that was found among processors in Kentucky that their operation was 
too small to warrant attention from terrorists. 
 This section also asked respondents if their facilities had ever been evaluated for 
security risks.  Three of eight respondents reported that they had not undergone any 
security evaluations.  None of these three respondents expressed any interest in having 
their facilities evaluated, which reflects the general lack of concern for an attack against 
their facilities found during this investigation. 
 
 Section 3: Outside Security Measures 
 Physical security measures taken to protect the facility itself are often the first line 
of defense against attack.  Features such as perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras, and 
alarm systems may deter would-be attackers long enough for police to arrive or prevent 
an attack from ever occurring.  This section was designed to research what sorts of 
physical security measures were being taken by meat processing facilities in Kentucky.  
Respondents were asked a series of yes/no questions enquiring about the three features 
discussed above, as well as whether or not doors and windows were locked during hours 
of non-operation. 
 The locking of doors and windows was the most commonly reported security 
measure.  All facilities reported that the windows and air vents were locked and secured.  
All but one facility reported that all entrances were secured during hours of non-
operation.  Alarm systems, utilized by approximately half the respondents, were reported 
as the next most common security measure.  Approximately half of those that reported 
having an alarm system also reported that the alarm systems maintained according to 
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manufacturing instructions.  Two users of alarm systems reported that the alarm systems 
were not maintained according to manufacturing instructions.  This is quite discouraging 
but reflective of the general lack of concern against an attack.  Perimeter fencing and 
surveillance cameras were reported least commonly among the respondents.  One facility 
reported perimeter fencing, and one facility reported surveillance cameras.  As the 
majority of facilities visited were in metropolitan areas, the lack of perimeter fencing 
makes sense.  There was just no room at these facilities for a fence around the property.  
Surveillance cameras are a major expense, and given the lack of concern against an 
attack, they may be seen as an unnecessary expense. 
 
 Section 4: Shipment Security 
 Packages, both incoming and outgoing, are potential sources for attack on a meat 
processing facility.  These packages may contain contaminated material designed to 
sicken animals or the human beings working with them.  Examining packages prior to 
sending or receiving them is an important preventative measure against an attack.  Every 
facility should have a plan for dealing with suspicious packages, if the need should ever 
arise.  For facilities with loading docks, these may be potential sources of entry for an 
attacker.  It is important to secure these areas during times of loading and unloading.  
This section was designed to research whether or not meat processors in Kentucky 
undertake preventative measures in these areas.  Respondents were asked a series of 
yes/no questions enquiring whether incoming and outgoing packages were examined, 
whether incoming and outgoing vehicles were examined, and whether loading docks 
were securing during periods of loading and unloading. 
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 The majority of facilities reported that packages were examined, both incoming 
and outgoing.  Although simple examination may not prevent every contaminated 
package from entering or leaving the facility, this step will decrease the likelihood of an 
attack through shipments.  Only three facilities reported having a loading dock.  Of these, 
only one reported that loading and unloading was not monitored.  As there were only 
three respondents with loading docks, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this.  
Certainly, it would be inappropriate to make any generalizations about the security of 
loading docks among all meat processors in Kentucky based on this data. 
 
 Section 5: Mail Security 
 This section of the questionnaire is related to Section 4 and seeks to examine 
preventative security measures taken by meat processors in Kentucky against deliberate 
attack through the mail.  The best way to prevent attack by mail is to ensure that all mail 
is opened away from any animal and meat processing activities at the facility.  Similar to 
the examination of packages, all mail should be examined for evidence of tampering prior 
to opening.  Employees should be trained to recognize suspicious mail.  For this section, 
respondents were asked a series of yes/no questions enquiring whether or not they opened 
mail in a safe location, whether or not mail was examined prior to opening, and whether 
or not employees were trained to recognize suspicious mail. 
 All nine respondents reported that mail was handled away from processing 
activities occurring at the facility.  This is quite encouraging, and it is likely that this is a 
typical behavior exhibited by meat processing facilities in Kentucky.  Approximately half 
the respondents reported that mail was examined before opening.  Ideally, all respondents 
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should examine mail prior to opening, as this is a simple preventative measure to 
undertake.  It is one that does not require much additional time or expense.  Only two 
respondents reported that employees at their facilities were trained to recognize 
suspicious mail.  It makes sense that this number should be low, as employees are often 
not responsible for opening mail at all. 
 
 Section 6: Indoor Security Measures 
 Although security measures designed to protect the exterior of the facility can 
prevent an attack from ever occurring, security measures to protect the interior of the 
facility also need to be implemented.  If contaminated material ever manages to enter the 
facility, security measures on the interior of the facility designed to detect such material 
and protect the safety of employees may minimize the damage.  These security measures 
include appropriate inventory documentation, clear demarcation of restricted areas, and 
emergency exit policies.  This section was designed to research whether or not meat 
processing facilities in Kentucky used some or all of these indoor security measures.  
Questions were posed to respondents enquiring about inventory documentation and 
updates, what the policy was for an unexpected change in the inventory, whether or not 
restricted areas were clearly demarcated, whether or not new or previously unused 
materials were examined before use, and whether or not emergency lighting and 
emergency exit policies were present. 
 Surprisingly, only two respondents stated that restricted areas were clearly 
marked and secured.  This is alarming, as customers may unwittingly enter these areas, 
which would compromise security and set-up a situation where potential contamination 
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may occur.  All but one meat processor reported that new and previously unused 
materials are examined before use.  This result is likely the case for most meat processors 
in Kentucky and gives no cause for concern.   
Six facilities reported that inventory was documented, and two facilities reported 
that inventory was not documented.  This is not a surprising finding.  Many meat 
processing facilities in Kentucky do not store meat products.  These facilities process 
meat brought in directly by the customer and return the meat the same day.  Inventory at 
these facilities is not required under federal law.  For those facilities that do document 
inventory, inventory is updated, on average, every 22.7 days, although a wide range from 
every day to every 90 days was reported.  The length of time between updates is likely 
related to how often product moves in and out of a facility.  If unexpected changes in 
inventory occur, five of the six facilities reported that appropriate authorities are alerted, 
and one respondent was unsure.  This is an encouraging observation. 
If an emergency does occur, having emergency exit policies in place greatly 
improves the safety and likelihood of survival for employees.  Safety can also be 
improved by providing emergency lighting and periodically drilling employees.  
Emergency response personnel should be aware of the facility’s emergency exit policies, 
in order to improve rescue efficiency.  Given the small size of the participating facilities, 
it was expected that there would be little necessity for emergency lighting.  Surprisingly, 
nearly half the respondents reported that they did have emergency lighting.  Six 
respondents reported that emergency exit policies were in place at their facilities, and 
three respondents reported that they had no emergency exit policies.  Ideally, all facilities 
would have emergency exit policies, as this can greatly decrease confusion during an 
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emergency.  However, many of the facilities had very few entrances, which may make 
having an exit policy unnecessary. 
 
Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security 
The slaughtering and processing areas of a meat processing facility are the most 
likely sources for potential contamination.  The meat is handled directly in these areas, so 
security is necessary.  This section also included security measures implemented for the 
protection of live animals stored at the facility.  Questions were asked regarding access to 
the animals or meat products, inspection of animals and products, inventory of animals 
and products, and visitation records and policies for handling visitors to any of these 
areas. 
Only four of nine respondents reported storage of live animals on their facilities.  
All respondents reported that appropriate federal inspections and laboratory testing were 
carried out, which is greatly encouraging.  All facilities kept some kind of inventory of 
each animal stored there, however only two facilities reported that the inventory 
contained the site of purchase.  If this information is missing during a federal 
investigation of an incident, it may be difficult to trace the source of contamination 
should that have occurred prior to the animal arriving at the facility.  All facilities 
reported that access to the animals was restricted to appropriate personnel and only one 
facility reported allowing visitation.  All facilities reported that visitors would be 
accompanied by personnel of the facility during the visit, but only two reported requiring 
the visitors to sign-in.  Ideally, complete visitation records would be kept by all facilities.  
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This information gives investigators documentation of potential sources of contamination 
during an incident. 
When live animals are stored at a meat processing facility, these animals are 
generally put to slaughter at some point.  The four facilities that stated that live animals 
were stored also stated that slaughtering was performed.  Visitation to the slaughtering 
facility was only allowed by one respondent.  Two stated that visitors were not required 
to sign in but were always accompanied by personnel of the facility.  A recording of who 
visited the facility was only kept by one respondent, likely the same one that allowed 
visitors.  All facilities reported that records of which animals were slaughtered as well as 
the date of slaughter were kept onsite.  All facilities reported that periodic laboratory 
testing was performed on slaughtered animals to detect the presence of disease, which is 
important to prevent the spread of contamination. 
Finally, the majority of meat processing facilities reported that meat products 
were stored onsite.  All of these facilities reported restriction of access to the meat 
products, which is potentially the most important security measure to take to prevent 
contamination of the products.  Six facilities reported that an inventory of all products 
stored at the facilities was kept onsite, while two stated an inventory was not kept.  If 
inventory is not documented and maintained, it may be difficult to prevent contaminated 
product from being slipped onto shelves or accidentally shipped.  Periodic laboratory 
testing of meat products was performed by five facilities, which is a good security 
measure to implement to detect and stop the spread of contamination. 
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Section 8: Water System Security 
Water sources can be potential sites of contamination by waterborne pathogens.  
These areas are commonly used by multiple animals, so the spread of contamination from 
these pathogens could be devastating.  Securing these sources can prevent attackers from 
getting near enough to any water sources to deliberately contaminate the source.  
Potential water sources in use by meat processing facilities are storage tanks of potable 
water, water reuse systems, transfer lines, and ice making equipment. 
Among the respondents in this study, water systems were very uncommonly 
utilized.  The most commonly used water system were transfer lines, utilized by two 
facilities.  Given the lack of positive response to this section of the study, no accurate 
conclusions may be drawn. 
 
Section 9: Hazardous Material Security 
Hazardous materials are potential sources of contamination for water and feed 
supplies at meat processing facilities.  The storage of such materials should be properly 
inventoried and secured, and the disposal of such materials should be performed 
according to current federal standards.  Any hazardous waste that may have to be 
temporarily stored onsite should be secured. 
Only seven respondents reported the storage of bulk quantities of hazardous 
materials.  Both of these respondents stated that access to these materials was restricted 
but an inventory for these materials was not kept.  Although it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about meat processing facilities from the data of two respondents, it is 
alarming that a proper inventory of these materials is not available.  If such 
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documentation exists, it is possible to detect theft of hazardous materials before a 
contamination incident would occur. 
 
Section 10: Information Security 
Information regarding facility layout or processing procedures is often kept onsite 
using paper-based or electronic systems, or both.  This information can be utilized by 
attackers to engineer a targeted attack against a specific area of the facility.  Securing this 
information is vital to protecting the integrity of the facility and preventing an attack.  If 
an electronic system is used, this system should, at minimum, be protected by a password 
and antivirus software.  Use of a firewall is also encouraged.  If a paper-based system is 
used, access to important documents should be locked and access should be restricted to 
only those that require the information to perform their daily duties. 
Three respondents reported that access to information regarding facility layout 
was not restricted.  This is likely due to the small size of the facilities managed by these 
respondents.  Many facilities were comprised of only one or two rooms, negating the 
necessity for maps or floor plans.  Nearly all facilities reported restriction of access to 
information regarding facility processing procedures and inventory documentation.  
Computer systems were utilized by six facilities, all of whom reported use of password 
protection.  Five of these respondents reported use of a firewall and virus protection 
software, all encouraging signs. 
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Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security 
The purpose of this section was to determine policies in place at meat processing 
facilities to prevent attacks by employees and visitors to the facility.  Employees at these 
facilities should be trust-worthy individuals, as determined by both a background check 
and an onsite interview.  Employees should always be recognizable to visitors by the use 
of identification materials, such as name tags or uniforms.  For larger facilities, both 
employees and visitors should be restricted from entering the facility with cameras.  
Security training for employees is recommended, and any employee reports of suspicious 
activity should be investigated immediately.  Identification material for visitors in an 
official capacity, such as federal inspectors, should have material identifying them as well 
as the intent of their visit. 
The majority of respondents in this study stated that employees were not required 
to wear identification materials.  It was explained that because of the small size of the 
facility in question, there were a very limited number of employees.  Those that were not 
employed by the facility were very recognizable to the employees.  However, it is unclear 
if the employees were very recognizable to the visitors.  Background checks were only 
used by half of the respondents.  This is likely because many of the facilities were family-
owned and family-run facilities.  These types of facilities would not require background 
checks.  Security training was generally not provided, likely due to the small size of the 
facilities.  There was very little interest in providing security training, which is reflective 
of the general lack of concern about an attack by the respondents.  Visitors were 
generally not identified in any tangible way. 
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Section 12: Incident Response 
Timely and efficient response to a contamination incident, either intentional or 
unintentional, minimizes damages and can prevent further spread of the contamination.  
Quarantine procedures and food recall plans should be in place and periodically tested.  
Facilities that implement such plans will be better prepared, should an incident arise. 
Seven facilities had product quarantine procedures in place.  This is encouraging 
and shows that food safety is of concern to facility owners.  Eight respondents stated that 
a food recall plan was in place, although only four reported having tested it.  Although it 
could be a difficult and inconvenient undertaking, testing the plan is important for 
improving efficiency and minimizing damages from an incident. 
 
Food Service Establishments 
This study was originally designed as a mailed questionnaire, with all food 
service establishments with permits at the BRDHD as the sampling frame.  The total 
sampling frame contained 536 food service establishments, and the original plan called 
for 316 of these establishments to receive surveys.  These 316 potential respondents were 
chosen randomly.  To test the response rate, 100 initial samples were sent out with a self-
addressed stamped envelope to return the survey.  Four of these surveys were returned.  It 
was decided that this methodology would not generate the necessary responses for the 
study, and a new methodology was designed.  In order to combat the lack of response, an 
attempt was undertaken to deliver the survey at the time of inspection by the local health 
department, in this case, the BRDHD.  It was thought that this would give the survey 
some credibility, as it was being supported by a trusted government source.  Several 
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surveys were completed in this manner.  The other surveys were completed by 
participants in the food manager certification classes taught by the health inspectors at the 
BRDHD.  This methodology reduced the sampling frame to only those food service 
establishments with permits in Warren County, Kentucky. 
As with the study designed for meat processing facilities, it was difficult to solicit 
participation in the security study for food service establishments.  The most commonly 
cited reason for refusal was a lack of time to complete the survey.  Many managers, 
particularly those that managed large chain restaurants, stated that further permission to 
participate in the study was required by upper-level management.  These managers stated 
that it was unlikely that permission would be granted and were disinclined to participate.  
In total, 35 surveys were completed. 
 A statistical comparison between restaurants, including chain and non-chain, and 
non-restaurants, including schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed.  A student’s t-
test was used to analyze those questions where a mean was calculated, and Fisher’s Exact 
test was used to analyze those questions containing count data.  Fisher’s Exact test was 
used instead of chi-square due to the small sample size present in the study.  An alpha 
significance level of 0.1 was used to determine statistical significance.  In total, there 
were statistically significant differences between the two groups found in twelve survey 
questions.  These questions are shown in Table 33. 
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Table 33. Statistically Significant Differences Found From a Study of Security in Food 
Service Establishments 
Question p-value 
(4) Concern About Food Tampering Event in Establishment 0.05 
(5) Concern With Food Defense 0.08 
(18) Background Checks 0.01 
(21) Collection of Identification Materials From Former Staff 0.1 
(34) Requirement For Visitors to Sign In 0.02 
(35) Availability of Documentation of Visitor Access 0.02 
(55C) Food Inventory Includes Food Storage Date 0.1 
(68) Bulk Products Stored in Easily Monitored Areas 0.06 
(70) Presence of Self-Service Areas 0.05 
(72) Presence of Vending Machines 0.002 
(74) Appropriate Location for Mail Handling 0.1 
(85) Use of Computer System 0.02 
 
 Several of these significant differences are easy to explain, such as the presence of 
vending machines and self-service areas.  These two items are often found in schools, 
hospitals, and hotels but are less likely to be found in restaurants.  Computer systems are 
also commonly utilized by schools, hospitals, and hotels, but are less commonly utilized 
by restaurants.  It is very unlikely to be required to sign-in when visiting a restaurant, 
however schools and hospitals often utilize this practice.  It goes along with this that 
visitation records would be maintained by schools and hospitals but not restaurants. 
It is surprising that a significant difference should be found in the level of concern 
about a deliberate food tampering incident.  It was assumed that concern would be high 
amongst both groups, however, neither group expressed particular concern regarding 
food tampering or food defense.  Non-restaurants were slightly more concerned with both 
food tampering and food defense.  As these include schools and hospitals, where security 
is considered of the utmost importance, it was surprising that little concern was 
expressed. 
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 Background checks were more likely to be conducted by non-restaurants, which is 
not particularly surprising as this group contains schools and hospitals.  However, 
collection of identification materials, including name tags and uniforms, from former 
employees is most likely to be conducted by restaurants.  As security is significantly 
more important to non-restaurants, it was surprising that more respondents in this group 
did not collect identification materials from former employees.  If one or more of these 
employees is considering an attack, it may be easier for them to blend in if they are 
wearing appropriate work attire. 
 It was found that the restaurant group was more likely to include the date of food 
storage in their food inventories than the non-restaurant group.  This is surprising, as the 
non-restaurant group is more concerned with food defense.  It is less surprising that non-
restaurants were more likely to store commonly used products stored in bulk, such as 
flour, spices, and sugar, in easily monitored areas.  However, as these products are likely 
to be targeted during a food tampering event, it is important that both groups be equally 
likely to place these items in easily monitored areas. 
 
Implications and Recommendations 
 
Meat Processors 
 Food defense is of little concern to meat processing facilities in Kentucky.  As 
most of these facilities in this area are very small, it was found that many processors felt 
that they were too small to be a target for terrorism.  These facilities may also lack the 
financial and technological resources necessary to implement a food defense plan.  
Several steps need to be taken to promote food defense among these facilities.  First, an 
education program with information about agroterrorism and the risk to very small 
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processing facilities should be developed.  Further studies could be conducted to 
determine the efficacy of these programs in raising awareness.  Second, the USDA 
should provide an inspector specifically trained in food defense.  This inspector could do 
a thorough examination of the facilities and make individual recommendations for 
improvements to be made.  Third, public funding should be made available for these 
facilities to use to improve defense.  Finally, the data collected during this study is only 
applicable to meat processing facilities in Kentucky.  Further research on meat processors 
around the U.S. is recommended. 
 
Food Service Establishments 
 Food service establishments in Warren County profess little concern with food 
defense.  The non-restaurant group was slightly more concerned overall with food 
defense than the restaurant group.  This is likely because the non-restaurant group 
contains schools and hospitals, which are locations where security is considered 
extremely important.  However, restaurants provide food service to many different people 
every day.  According to the USDA, full-service restaurants and fast food chains are the 
two largest locations where Americans eat out.53  Since so many more Americans 
patronize restaurants than patronize non-restaurants, food defense should be of highest 
concern to the restaurant group.  In order to promote food defense in this group, several 
recommended actions should be undertaken.  First, education programs promoting food 
defense should be provided to restaurant owners and managers.  Further studies could be 
conducted to determine the efficacy of these programs in raising awareness.  Second, 
more media coverage of food tampering incidences may increase awareness of risk.  
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Finally, the FDA should develop programs to provide incentives to restaurants that take 
action to improve food defense. 
 Further research on this subject is required.  The data collected during this study 
is only applicable to Warren County, Kentucky.  A more national study of food service 
establishments is recommended.  It was difficult to collect this data without the help of 
the local health department, so further cooperation with local government agencies will 
be required in any future studies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Agroterrorism and food tampering are of increasing concern to the U.S.  Although 
few documented incidences of agroterrorism have been reported, hundreds of pages of 
documented plans to attack the U.S. in this way have been discovered from Al Qaeda.28  
For this reason, it is important to implement security strategies in food processing plants 
and food service establishments.  Meat processing facilities in Kentucky express little 
concern that they will be the target of an attack.  Regardless of this, these facilities 
implement strategies to promote food defense and safety.  In order to improve defense of 
these facilities, programs need to be developed to educate food industry operators and 
managers about agroterrorism and the risk to very small operations.  Among food service 
establishments, non-restaurant type establishments are slightly more concerned with food 
tampering and food defense than restaurants, however neither group expressed particular 
concern with either.  Although these groups take food safety very seriously, food defense 
should also be of great concern. 
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APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL FORM 
 
 
A LEADING AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WITH INTERNATIONAL REACH 
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE 
 
 
 
DATE: June 27, 2012 
 
TO: Morgan Webb-Yeates, MPH 
FROM: Western Kentucky University (WKU) IRB 
 
PROJECT TITLE: [340998-1] Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing 
and Food Service Establishments in Kentucky 
REFERENCE #: IRB12-312 
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project 
 
ACTION:
 AP
PROVED APPROVAL DATE:
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e 27, 2012 
 
REVIEW TYPE: Exempt from Full Board Review 
 
Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this project. The Western Kentucky 
University (WKU) IRB has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an 
appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All 
research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission. 
 
This submission has received Exempt from Full Board Review based on the applicable federal 
regulation. Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of 
the project and insurance of participant understanding followed by an implied consent form. 
Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher 
and research participant. Federal regulations require each participant receive a copy of the 
consent document. 
 
Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this office 
prior to initiation. Please use the appropriate revision forms for this procedure. 
 
All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others and SERIOUS and 
UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the 
appropriate reporting forms for this procedure. All FDA and sponsor reporting requirements 
should also be followed. 
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All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported 
promptly to this office. 
 
This project has been determined to be a Minimal Risk project. 
 
Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of three years after the 
completion of the project. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact Paul Mooney at (270) 745-2129 or 
paul.mooney@wku.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all 
correspondence with this committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within 
Western Kentucky University (WKU) IRB's records.
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE USED SECURITY STUDY OF MEAT 
PROCESSING FACILITIES 
 
 
Project Title:  Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing and Food 
Service Establishments in Kentucky 
 
Investigator:  Morgan Webb-Yeates, Western Kentucky University 
Department of Physics and Astronomy, 937-657-8108 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Vijay Golla, Western Kentucky University 
Department of Public Health, 270-745-2448 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Meat Processing Facilities 
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Section 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section is for analysis purposes only. 
 
D1. How would you describe the size of this facility? 
 
 О Small 
 О Medium 
 О Large 
 
 
D2. What meat products are processed at this facility?  Check any that apply. 
 
 О Beef/Veal 
 О Pork 
 О Poultry 
 О Sheep/Lamb 
 О Other   Please List:____________________________ 
 О None 
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Section 2: Agroterrorism 
 
This section is designed to assess industry concerns about bioterrorism, agroterrorism, and 
security. 
 
 
 
1. Bioterrorism is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “the intentional 
release of a pathogen or biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”  How familiar are 
you with the concept of “bioterrorism”? 
 
 
1   2   3   4 
 
Completely Unfamiliar Somewhat Unfamiliar  Somewhat Familiar  Completely Familiar 
 
 
 
2. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism.  It is defined as the deliberate introduction of a 
plant or animal disease with the goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.  
How familiar are you with the concept of “agroterrorism”? 
 
 
 
1   2   3   4 
 
Completely Unfamiliar Somewhat Unfamiliar  Somewhat Familiar  Completely Familiar 
 
 
 
3. Given what you know about agroterrorism, are you worried about an agroterrorism 
attack occurring against the United States? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not At All Worried        Extremely Worried 
 
 
 
4. Given what you know about agroterrorism, are you worried that your facility may be the 
target of an agroterrorist attack? 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not At All Worried        Extremely Worried 
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5. Has this facility ever been evaluated for security risks? 
 О    Yes  skip to Question 7   
 О    No   proceed to Question 6 
 О    I don’t know proceed to Question 6 
 
 
6. Are you interested in undergoing evaluation for security risks? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 3: Outside Security Measures 
 
The following ten sections are designed to assess security implementations in Kentucky meat 
processing facilities.  They will be used to document trends in security strengths and 
vulnerabilities in facilities across Kentucky.  They are not designed for me to identify strengths 
and weaknesses at individual facilities, however, you may use them for that purpose if you wish.  
I would be happy to provide more information about USDA food defense recommendations upon 
request.  Contact information for me, my research advisor, and the Institutional Review Board 
will be provided to you. 
 
7. Is there a perimeter fence that encloses the entire facility? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
8. Are surveillance cameras used in this facility? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
9. Are all entrances locked and secured during non-working hours? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 10 
 О    No   skip to Question 11 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 11 
 
 
10. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Are windows and air vents locked and secured? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 12 
 О    No   skip to Question 13 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 13 
 
 
12. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure? 
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13. Are there any outdoor animal or meat storage facilities? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 14 
 О    No   skip to Question 17 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 17 
 
 
14. Is access to these facilities controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know  
 
 
15. Are the entrances to these facilities locked and secured during non-working hours? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 16 
 О    No   skip to Question 17 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 17 
 
 
16. How do you ensure they are locked? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Are there any alarm systems in place to detect unauthorized entry? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 18 
 О    No   skip to Question 20 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 20 
 
 
18. Are these regularly maintained and updated according to manufacturer instructions? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know  
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19. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized entry?  Please 
describe. 
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Section 4: Shipment Security 
21. Are incoming packages examined for evidence of tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
22. Are outgoing packages examined for evidence of tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
23. What is the procedure if tampering is suspected? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Are incoming vehicles examined before entrance to the facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
25. Are outgoing vehicles examined before exiting the facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
26. Is there a loading dock at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 27 
 О    No   skip to Question 29 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 29 
 
 
27. If so, are loading and unloading secured or monitored? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 28 
 О    No   skip to Question 29 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 29 
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28. How is loading and unloading secured or monitored? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. Are there any other security measures in place regarding incoming and outgoing 
shipments? 
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Section 5: Mail Security 
30. Is mail handling done away from any animal or meat processing activities or from any 
ingredients used at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
31. Is mail examined for suspicious-looking envelopes? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
32. Are employees trained to look for suspicious mail? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
33. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail? 
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Section 6: Indoor Security Measures 
34. Are restricted areas of the facility clearly marked and secured? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
35. Are new materials or previously unused materials examined before use in the facility?  
Materials may include any new ingredients, animal feed, cleaning supplies, etc. that are 
purchased for use in this facility. 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
36. Is inventory documented? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
37. How often is inventory updated, e.g. once a week, once a month, etc? 
 
 
 
38. If unexpected changes in inventory occur, are they reported to appropriate authorities? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
39. Is emergency lighting present in this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
40. Are there emergency exit policies in place for this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 41   
 О    No   skip to Question 44 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 44 
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41. Are employees aware of the emergency exit policies? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
42. Are employees periodically drilled on where to go in the event of an emergency? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
43. Are emergency response personnel, such as police or fire departments, aware of the 
emergency exit policies? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security 
44. Are live animals stored at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 45  
 О    No   skip to Question 68 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 68 
 
 
45. Are animals in this facility inspected by a federal, state, or local veterinarian? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
46. Are animals screened for abnormal behavior that may indicate the presence of disease? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
47. What is the procedure in place when a diseased animal is discovered?  Please answer the 
following:   
 
a. What institutions (CDC, USDA, FDA, state or local government), if any, are 
alerted when the animal is discovered?   
 
 
 
b. Is the diseased animal slaughtered?   Yes No I don’t know 
 
c.  Is the animal or animal carcass sent for testing? Yes No I don’t know   
 
d. Are other animals in this facility quarantined and tested? Yes No I don’t 
know 
 
e. Are there any other procedures you would like to mention? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48. Is access to animals in this facility controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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49. Are records maintained of who entered and exited animal storage areas? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
50. Are records maintained for every animal stored at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 51   
 О    No   skip to Question 53    
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 53 
 
 
51. Do the records include where the animal was purchased from? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
52. Do the records include when the animal was purchased? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
53. Are purchase receipts maintained onsite for animals stored in this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 54  
 О    No   skip to Question 55 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 55 
 
 
54. For how long are these receipts kept at this facility?  
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
55. Are visitors allowed access to animal storage facilities? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 56  
 О    No   skip to Question 58 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 58 
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56. Are visitors required to sign in? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
57. Are visitors accompanied by appropriate personnel at all times? 
  
О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
58. Is animal slaughtering performed at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 59   
 О    No   skip to Question 68 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 68 
 
 
59. Is access to the slaughtering area controlled and/or restricted? 
  
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
60. Are records maintained of who entered and exited the slaughtering area? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
61. Are records maintained regarding which animals are slaughtered? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
62. Are records maintained regarding when each animal was slaughtered? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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63. Is periodic testing on slaughtered animals done in order to detect the presence of 
diseases? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 64 
 О    No   skip to Question 65 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 65 
 
 
 
 
64. Are visitors ever allowed access to the slaughtering facilities? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 62  
 О    No   skip to Question 68 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 68 
 
 
65. Are visitors to the slaughtering facility required to sign in? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
66. Are visitors to the slaughtering facility accompanied by appropriate personnel at all 
times? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
67. Is access to equipment used for animal handling controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
68. Are meat products stored at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 69 
 О    No   skip to Question 72 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 72 
 
 
69. Is access to meat products controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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70. Are inventory records regarding the date of storage of meat products available? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
 
 
71. Is periodic testing performed on meat products to detect disease and ensure quality? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
  
 
72. Are ingredients or products other than meat, used in food meant for animal or human 
consumption, stored here? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 73 
 О    No   skip to Question 78 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 78 
 
 
73. Is access to these products controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
74. Are inventory records regarding the company these ingredients were purchased from 
available? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
75. Are inventory records regarding the date of purchase of these ingredients available? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
76. Are inventory records regarding the date of storage of these ingredients available? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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76. Is periodic examination of the ingredients performed to check for evidence of 
tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 8: Water System Security 
78. Are storage tanks of potable water used in this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 79 
 О    No   skip to Question 82 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 82 
 
 
79. Is access to the water tanks controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
80. Are the water tanks monitored for evidence of tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
81. Is periodic quality testing performed on the water in these tanks? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
82. Is a water reuse system in place at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 83 
 О    No   skip to Question 85 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 85 
 
 
83. Is access to the water reuse system controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
84. Is the water reuse system monitored for evidence of tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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85. Are transfer lines employed to move water or ingredients used in animal or human food 
consumption? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 86 
 О    No   skip to Question 88 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 88 
 
 
86. Is access to the transfer lines controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
87. Are the transfer lines periodically examined for evidence of tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
88. Is ice-making equipment in use at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 89 
 О    No   skip to Question 90 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 90 
 
 
89. Is access to the ice-making equipment controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
95 
 
Section 9: Hazardous Material Security 
90. Are any hazardous materials stored at this facility in bulk quantities?  These may 
include cleaning materials, laboratory materials, or sanitizers. 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 91  
 О    No   skip to Question 94 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 94 
 
 
91. Is access to stored hazardous materials controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
92. Is an inventory of all hazardous materials stored at this facility on file? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 93   
 О    No   skip to Question 94 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 94 
 
 
93. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory of hazardous 
materials? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94. Is all hazardous waste at this facility disposed of properly according to appropriate 
federal guidelines? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
95. Is access to hazardous waste controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 10: Information Security 
96. Is access to information regarding facility layout controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
97. Is access to information regarding facility processing controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
98. Is access to any inventory documents kept at this facility controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
99. Is a computer system in use at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 100  
 О    No   skip to Question 103 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 103 
 
 
100. Is a password required for access to the computer system? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
101. Is a firewall in place to protect the computer system? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
102. Is virus protection software used to protect the computer system? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
97 
 
Section 11: Employee/Non-employee Security 
103. Are employees required to wear identification materials, such as badges or name tags? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
104. Are employees required to sign in and out at the beginning and end of their work 
period? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
105. Are new employees required to undergo background checks before beginning work at 
this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
106. Are employees restricted from taking cameras, or cell phones with cameras, on to this 
facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
107. Are employees required to undergo security or awareness training at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  skip to Question 109  
 О    No   proceed to Question 108 
 О    I don’t know proceed to Question 108 
 
 
108. Are you interested in providing security or awareness training for your employees? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
109. Is information available for employees on the policies for responding to threats? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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110. Are employees required to report suspicious activity or unidentified individuals at this 
facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 111  
 О    No   skip to Question 112 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 112 
 
 
111. Are employee reports investigated at the time of submission? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
112. Are visitors required to sign in when entering restricted areas of this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
113. Are visitors required to wear identification materials, such as badges or name tags 
when entering restricted areas of this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
114. Are visitors restricted from taking cameras, or cell phones with cameras, on to 
restricted areas of this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 12: Incident Response 
115. Are there procedures in place at this facility to quarantine products suspected of being 
tampered with? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
116. Is a food recall plan in place at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 117 
 О    No   skip to Question 118 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 118 
 
 
117. Has the food recall plan undergone testing? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
118. Are all emergency and personnel contact information kept up to date? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
 
This is the end of the survey.  Thank you for taking the time to respond. 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN STUDY OF FOOD SERVICE 
ESTABLISHMENTS 
 
 
Project Title:  Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing and Food 
Service Establishments in Kentucky 
 
Investigator:  Morgan Webb-Yeates, Western Kentucky University 
Department of Physics and Astronomy, 937-657-8108 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Vijay Golla, Western Kentucky University 
Department of Public Health, 270-745-2448 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Food Service Establishments 
101 
 
Section 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This section is used for analysis purposes only. 
 
D1. How would you describe this food service establishment? 
 О Chain Restaurant 
 О  Non-Chain Restaurant 
 О  School/Child Day Care Cafeteria 
 О Hospital/Long-term Care Cafeteria 
 О Hotel/Bed and Breakfast 
 О Other 
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Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense 
1. Bioterrorism is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “the 
intentional release of a pathogen or biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”  
How familiar are you with the concept of “bioterrorism”? 
 
 
1   2   3   4 
 
Completely Unfamiliar Somewhat Unfamiliar  Somewhat Familiar  Completely Familiar 
 
 
 
 
2. How concerned are you about a bioterrorism attack occurring against the United 
States? 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not At All Concerned        Extremely Concerned 
 
 
 
 
3. Food tampering is related to bioterrorism.  Food tampering is defined as the 
deliberate contamination of food products with the intent to cause harm.  How 
concerned are you about an incident of food tampering occurring in the United 
States? 
 
 
1   2   3   4 
 
Completely Unfamiliar Somewhat Unfamiliar  Somewhat Familiar  Completely Familiar 
 
 
 
 
4. How concerned are you about an incident of food tampering occurring in your 
establishment? 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not At All Concerned        Extremely Concerned 
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5. Food defense is defined by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
as “protecting the food supply from intentional contamination…by people that want 
to do us harm.”  How concerned are you with food defense in your establishment? 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not At All Concerned        Extremely Concerned 
 
 
 
 
6.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) publishes a Guidance Document for 
Retail Food Stores and Food Establishments with information and voluntary 
recommendations regarding food defense.  Are you familiar with this document? 
 
 
1   2   3   4 
 
Completely Unfamiliar Somewhat Unfamiliar  Somewhat Familiar  Completely Familiar 
 
 
7. Are you interested in reviewing this document? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
104 
 
Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense 
 
8. Is there a food defense plan in place at this establishment? 
 
О    Yes  proceed to Question 9   
 О    No  skip to Question 11 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 11 
 
 
9. Are all employees at this establishment familiar with this plan? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
10. Has this plan been exercised within the last year? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
11. Are periodic security inspections of the establishment conducted by a manager 
or designated member of the staff? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
12. Are management employees familiar with 24-hour contact information for 
federal, state, and local (if available): 
 
• Police    Yes  No  I don’t know 
 
• Fire    Yes  No  I don’t know 
 
• Ambulance   Yes  No  I don’t know 
 
• Public Health Department Yes  No  I don’t know 
 
• Homeland Security Agency Yes  No  I don’t know 
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13. Food tampering is the deliberate introduction of a contaminant to a food 
product.  Are staff members encouraged to be vigilant about food tampering? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
14. Are staff members aware of whom they should report a suspected tampering 
incident to? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
15. Are staff reports of food tampering investigated immediately by an appropriate 
authority? 
 
О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know  
 
 
16. Is a manager or designated “person in charge” present at all hours of operation? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
17. Are managers trained to restrict/exclude employees that are experiencing 
symptoms of foodborne illness, as required by law? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense 
 
18. Are new employees required to undergo a background check before being hired 
at this establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
19. Are employees required to wear name tags to identify them during their shift? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
20. Are employees required to wear uniforms to identify them during their shift? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
21.  Are name tags, uniforms, or other means of identifying employees collected 
when an employee no longer works at this establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
22. Is documentation available for which employees are working in this 
establishment at any given time? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
23. Are restricted areas of this establishment clearly marked? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 О    Not Applicable 
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24. Is access to restricted areas granted only to those employees who require access 
to perform their job duties? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 О    Not Applicable 
 
 
25. Are employees required to undergo security training at this establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No   
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
26. Is information available for employees on the policies for responding to threats? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
27. Are employees required to report any activity they feel is suspicious?  Suspicious 
activities may include unauthorized access to restricted areas or suspected 
tampering of food products. 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
28. Is monitoring for unusual activity in staff members conducted by this 
establishment?  Unusual activity may include: arriving unusually early or staying 
unusually late without an appropriate excuse, accessing restricted documents, 
removing documents from the facility, or bringing cameras to work. 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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29. Are employees trained to recognize symptoms of foodborne illness? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
30. Are employees trained to report if they, or other employees, are experiencing 
symptoms of foodborne illness? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security 
 
31. Are customers restricted from entering food preparation areas of this 
establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
32. Visitors to the establishment are those that are present in an official capacity, 
including but not limited to delivery staff, health inspectors, contractors, or sales 
representatives.  Are visitors required to show proper identification before being 
admitted to restricted areas? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
33. Are visitors required to show documentation as to the purpose of their visit? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
34. Are visitors required to sign in before entering restricted areas? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
35. Are visitor access records maintained in this establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
36. Are visitors accompanied at all times when present in restricted areas? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security 
37. Are all entrances locked and secured during non-working hours? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 37 
 О    No  skip to Question 39 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 39 
 
 
38. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Are windows and air vents locked and secured? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 40 
 О    No  skip to Question 41 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 41 
 
 
 
 
40. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. Are surveillance cameras used to monitor suspicious activity inside the 
establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
42. Are surveillance cameras used to monitor suspicious activity outside the 
establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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43. Are there any alarm systems in place to detect unauthorized entry? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 44 
 О    No  skip to Question 46 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 46 
 
 
 
 
44. Are these regularly maintained and updated according to manufacturer 
instructions? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
45. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. Are there any outdoor storage facilities? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 47 
 О    No  skip to Question 50 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 50 
 
 
47. Is access to these facilities controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes    
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know  
 
 
48. Are the entrances to these facilities locked and secured during non-working 
hours? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 49 
 О    No  skip to Question 50 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 50 
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49. How do you ensure they are locked? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized entry?  Please 
describe.
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Section 7: Food Security 
 
51. Is food delivered to this establishment by approved outside sources? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
52. Is food that is delivered to this establishment inspected by employees for 
evidence of tampering? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
53. What is this establishment’s policy for receiving unexpected food in a delivery? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54. Is an inventory maintained of all foods present in the establishment? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
55. Does this inventory contain records for: 
 
• What foods have been delivered   Yes  No I don’t know 
 
• Where delivered foods have been purchased from Yes No I don’t 
know 
 
• When foods are stored    Yes No I don’t know 
 
• Where foods are stored    Yes No I don’t know 
 
• Expiration dates of stored food   Yes No I don’t know 
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56. How often is inventory updated, i.e. once a week, once a month, etc? 
 
 
 
57. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory 
records? 
 
 
 
 
 
58. Are all foods stored in this establishment labeled? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
59. What is the policy at this establishment when unlabeled food is discovered? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60. Are stored foods inspected by employees before use? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
61. Are all foods stored according to the time/temperature controls required by the 
FDA? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
 
 
62. Are all foods prepared according to the time/temperature controls required by 
the FDA? 
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 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
63. Are potentially contaminated foods stored separately from usable foods? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
64. Are foods suspected of contamination sent away for laboratory testing? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
65. Are expired or uneaten foods discarded according to FDA guidelines? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
66. Is equipment used for food preparation cleaned before use with another type of 
food? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
67. Are different types of foods stored separately?  For example, are meat products 
kept separate from produce? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
68. Are commonly used food products stored in bulk placed in easily-monitored 
public areas?  These products may include herbs, spices, oils, coffee grounds, salt, 
pepper, flour, sugar, baking soda/powder, etc.   
 
 О    Yes   
116 
 
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
 
69. Is all produce washed according to FDA guidelines? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
70. Self-service areas are areas where customers are allowed to serve themselves 
food products.  Buffets and salad bars are examples of self-service areas.  Are self-
service areas used in this establishment? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 71   
 О    No  skip to Question 72 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 72 
 
 
71. Are self-service areas constantly monitored for tampering activity? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
72. Are vending machines used in this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 73  
 О    No  skip to Question 74  
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 74 
 
 
73. Is access to vending machine products restricted to authorized personnel? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
117 
 
Section 8: Mail Security 
74. Is mail handling done away from any animal or meat processing activities or 
from any ingredients used at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
75. Is mail examined for suspicious-looking envelopes? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
76. Are employees trained to look for suspicious mail? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
77. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail? 
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Section 9: Hazardous Materials  
78. Are any hazardous materials stored at this establishment in bulk quantities?  
These may include cleaning materials or sanitizers. 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 79  
 О    No  skip to Question 82 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 82 
 
 
79. Is access to stored hazardous materials controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
80. Is an inventory of all hazardous materials stored at this establishment on file? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 81   
 О    No  skip to Question 82 
 О    I don’t know skip to Question 82 
 
 
81. What is the procedure for any inconsistency discovered in the inventory of 
hazardous materials? 
 
 
 
 
 
82. Is all hazardous waste at this facility disposed of properly according to 
appropriate federal guidelines? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
83. Is access to hazardous waste controlled and/or restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
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Section 10: Information Security 
84. Is access to any inventory documents kept at this facility controlled and/or 
restricted? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
85. Is a computer system in use at this facility? 
 
 О    Yes  proceed to Question 86 
 О    No  skip to End 
 О    I don’t know skip to End 
 
 
86. Is a password required for access to the computer system? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
87. Is a firewall in place to protect the computer system? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
88. Is virus protection software used to protect the computer system? 
 
 О    Yes   
 О    No    
 О    I don’t know 
 
 
This is the end of the survey.  Thank you for taking the time to respond.  If you would 
like to participate in the iPod Touch give-away drawing, please email your name, 
address, and phone number to Morgan Webb-Yeates.  Contact information for Morgan is 
provided below.  Feel free to contact Morgan with regards to any questions you may have 
about this research. 
 
 
Morgan Webb-Yeates, MPH 
Western Kentucky University Department of Physics and Astronomy 
Cell: 937-657-8108 
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Work: 270-781-8039 Ext. 122 
Email: morgan.webb-yeates872@topper.wku.edu 
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF RESPONSES FROM FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS-MEAT 
PROCESSORS 
 
10. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked? 
1) “staff responsible” 
2) “two walkthroughs by employee, management” 
3) “padlocks, regular locks on doors” 
4) “phisical (sic) check” 
5) “alarm system” 
 
12. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure? 
1) “Vents are locked inside building. There are no windows at this facility” 
2) “constantly locked” 
3) “have locks on them” 
4) “check on daily basis” 
5) “phisical (sic) check” 
6) “they were constructed that way & we have motion detectors on our alarm” 
7) “there (sic) bolted” 
 
16. How do you ensure they (entrances to outdoor animal or meat storage) are 
locked? 
1) “check” 
 
19. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly? 
1) “6 Months” 
2) “Everyday” 
3) “once a year” 
4) “Daily” 
 
20. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized 
entry?  Please describe. 
1) “No” 
2) “We are a fairly small operation where all the employees know one another, 
someone whose is not employeed (sic) by us is obvious to the workers here” 
3) “N/A” 
4) “Payed security guard in house outside facility. Police circle frequently” 
5) “N/A” 
6) “No” 
7) “No” 
8)  “police drive by” 
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23. What is the procedure if tampering is suspected? 
1) “The outbound are samples headed for labs, they have a special tape and are taken 
directly to shipment” 
2) “Ask employees if anyone noticed anything. If find something an intruder had 
done, would call authorities” 
3) “Pull it aside, retain the product” 
4) “visual” 
5) “Incoming package are rejected outgoing are held & examined” 
6) “Product is examined and a decision is made to properly discard” 
7) “Never had problem” 
8) “hold for management” 
 
28. How is loading and unloading secured or monitored? 
1)  “The dock area is headed up by a owner of the business, he knows all people who 
work at facility” 
2) “All loading & unloading is approved and monitored by our employees” 
3) “Troopers meat truck backs up to front door & meat is wheeled in under our 
inspector” 
 
29. Are there any other security measures in place regarding incoming and 
outgoing shipments? 
1) “Incoming shipments have scales that must be checked before accepting the 
product. Outgoing shipments are held inside overhang until drivers arrive to leave 
for the day.” 
2) “examination” 
3) “retain products for testing before shipped, testing products” 
4) “No-just visual inspection” 
5) “No” 
6) “No” 
7) “No” 
 
33. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail? 
1) “None. Never had that problem” 
2) “N/A” 
3) “call sheriff” 
4) “We throw it away or call authorities” 
5) “Management takes care of mail” 
 
47a. What institutions (CDC, USDA, FDA, state or local government), if any, are 
alerted when the animal is discovered? 
1) “Federal inspector observes before slaughter; sheriff” 
2) “district office of USDA – federal office of USDA” 
3) “FSIS, USDA” 
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47e. Are there any other procedures you would like to mention? 
1) “N/A” 
2) “’suspect animals’ – has a puncture mark, goes into freezer locked by USDA until 
testing can occur” 
3) “N/A” 
 
93. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory of 
hazardous materials? 
1) “none” 
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APPENDIX E: LIST OF RESPONSES FROM FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS-FOOD 
SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS 
  
38. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked? 
1. “double check doors” 
2. “Have signs posted to keep doors locked at all times” 
3. “locked with keys, set alarm” 
4. “Door locks, check list, mgt” 
5. “We lock them” 
6. “I am responsible for door #3. for example and certain people are responsible for 
a area.” 
7. “With a key & alarm” 
8. “Manager locks them” 
9. “yes” 
10. “locking them and checking before leaving” 
11. “shut doors” 
12. “Checked by management” 
13. “Lock” 
14. “At all times” 
15. “-Alarm is set & doors are check; - Also all doors must have to have a key to get 
in” 
16. “We are required to have someone in kitchen at all times. All other doors are 
controlled by electronic code keypads” 
17. “pull door shut thrght (sic)” 
18. “Periodic checks conducted” 
19. “Check them myself” 
20. “We all have a code that we have to use going & coming” 
21. “Alarm” 
22. “When locked doors are pulled on to make sure they have properly latched.” 
23. “Check locks twice” 
24. “lock doors, double check when closed” 
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      40. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?  
1. “Solid windows vents on roof duct to (sic) small for person to enter” 
2. “inaccessible” 
3. “windows don’t open. Air vents locked with screens & vents. Access to Roof 
locked with pad⋅lock” 
4. “check list, mgt.” 
5. “Can’t open” 
6. “yes” 
7. “The (sic) remain locked/closed” 
8. “look at them” 
9. “Checked weekly” 
10. “Lock them” 
11. “Daily” 
12. “they get checked once a week” 
13. “Lock windows” 
14. “Routine checks and maintenance” 
15. “Check daily” 
16. “Check them” 
17. “They are checked daily” 
18. “double check” 
19. “Windows don’t open” 
 
45. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly? 
1. “Weekly” 
2. “Every 6 months” 
3. “daily, weekly,” 
4. “no alarm – camera systems” 
5. “Don’t know” 
6. “Never” 
7. “Monthly” 
8. “Daily” 
9. “Maintained daily by security staff” 
10. “Daily” 
11. “Daily” 
12. “Every day” 
13. “Daily” 
14. “Once month” 
15. “Every 6 weeks” 
16. “Everyday” 
17. “At least annually” 
18. “Weekly test” 
19. “every week” 
20. “Monthly” 
21. “just started” 
22. “monthly” 
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49. How do you ensure they (outdoor storage facilities) are locked? 
1. “Pad lock. 8ft tall fence” 
2. “check list, mgt.” 
3. “Locked and always double checked” 
4. “Only unlocked by management” 
5. “Check every day” 
6. “Check before leaving” 
7. “they are checked nightly” 
8. “Regular manager inspections” 
9. “use a key” 
10. “Door automatically locks – alarm is set each night and door secured and locked.” 
11. “They are checked daily & a code is used” 
12. “Lock on outside of the door & cameras are outside as well” 
13. “key & lock” 
 
50. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized 
entry?  Please describe. 
1. “I don’t know” 
2. “No” 
3. “all maintenance/services are set to a routine, and service must be requested by 
manager, must be signed by management on invoice stating start & finish time 
and who preformed (sic) service.” 
4. “We have to clear back door before opening.” 
5. “No” 
6. “No” 
7. “We haved (sic) a specially trained security dep. at our facility” 
8. “any visitor has to go through front office of school to enter premises.” 
9. “Door Cover – Alarm System” 
10. “Keypad on door code protected” 
11. “Every Entrance is Locked until Opening Business” 
12. “no” 
13. “-All doors are lock but main entrance during working hours; -cameras; -Alarm 
system” 
14. “the front doors usually stay unlocked but can be locked internally” 
15. “Security cameras” 
16. “camaras (sic)and locks.” 
17. “Monitored by management.” 
18. “Just the codes that we use. no one else knows the codes” 
19. “N/A” 
20. “no” 
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53. What is this establishment’s policy for receiving unexpected food in a 
delivery? 
1. “N/A” 
2. “Sent back” 
3. “Return to delivery company” 
4. “return it.” 
5. “check invoice to insure it was to be delivered here. All things “auto shiped” (sic) 
from company we are made aware of befor (sic) hand. Ex. menu change, food 
provider change,” 
6. “Send it back.” 
7. “Call our Supervisor to see if it is a special order.” 
8. “I do not get unexpected food in a delivery.” 
9. “Send it back” 
10. “Decline” 
11. “Returning if now quality” 
12. “Return” 
13. “I.D. Know how manager handles that” 
14. “Don’t know” 
15. “We have more delivered” 
16. “Send it back to supplier” 
17. “do not accept – return for credit” 
18. “Call & send back” 
19. “refuse or discard immediately” 
20. “We immediately contact food supplier and separate unexpected food from 
normal delivery” 
21. “Notification of our corporate office as well as food vendor” 
22. “Don’t” 
23. “No” 
24. “We notify the deliverer & the manager” 
25. “Report to manager asap, let them speak to delivery person” 
26. “Reject” 
27. “I don’t know” 
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57. What is the procedure for an inconsistencies discovered in the inventory 
records? 
1. “N/A” 
2. “Call owners” 
3. “I call the company” 
4. “talk to central office, make note and corrections” 
5. “check product usages/wastes. Keep prep items to a minamum (sic)” 
6. “call higher mgt right then” 
7. “We would have to look back on History.” 
8. “Adjustments” 
9. “Search for it” 
10. “Tell a manager” 
11. “Operation change” 
12. “investigated & corrected” 
13. “their (sic) is no inconsistencies” 
14. “discussions” 
15. “documented & tell manager” 
16. “go back and recheck. further investigate inventory. check security tapes.” 
17. “Audit” 
18. “Dispose of it” 
19. “We notify the correct people” 
20. “not sure.” 
21. “small mom & pop. inventory has been pretty good” 
22. “Removal” 
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59. What is the policy at this establishment when unlabeled food is discovered? 
1. “Throw away” 
2. “Throw away” 
3. “1) check with cook first 2) tell them to put label” 
4. “throw out.” 
5. “correct the action. Remind all employees the importance of proper labeling.” 
6. “Discard” 
7. “I (sic) would be dystroyed (sic).” 
8. “Trash” 
9. “Remove it” 
10. “1. verbal warning 2. write up 3. termination” 
11. “Trashed” 
12. “Label it” 
13. “give to manager” 
14. “Discarded” 
15. “Throw out” 
16. “management” 
17. “Open or throw away if no date” 
18. “discard immediately” 
19. “Discard” 
20. “to throw away and not use” 
21. “Food is opened but not used.” 
22. “Discard” 
23. “Dispose” 
24. “Throw out” 
25. “Toss it out” 
26. “everything is labeled” 
27. “Removal” 
28. “Ask” 
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77. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail? 
1. “I don’t know” 
2. “Report it to authorities” 
3. “contact corporate” 
4. “call higher mgt.” 
5. “Don’t get it here” 
6. “Show a manager” 
7. “I don’t know” 
8. “Don’t know” 
9. “Not handling it” 
10. “I don’t know” 
11. “report to authorities; discard” 
12. “None” 
13. “Call police” 
14. “The (sic) notify the correct authorities” 
15. “Call security” 
16. “Opened mail anything on mail” 
17. “employees do not handle the mail” 
 
81. What is the procedure for any inconsistency discovered in the inventory of 
hazardous materials? 
1. “find out why” 
2. “talk to central office, make note and corrections” 
3. “all access is approved By management we hand out what is needed.” 
4. “We would contact our prinicple (sic) & my supervisor” 
5. “I don’t inventory our chemicals, they would only be delime for the lime in the 
dishwasher” 
6. “n/a” 
7. “Investigate & correct” 
8. “same as food” 
9. “Audit” 
10. “Dispose” 
11. “We notify the correct authorities” 
12. “Report to manager asap” 
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